The Option Contract: Irrevocable Not Irrejectable by Cozzillio, Michael J.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 39 
Issue 2 Winter 1990 Article 7 
1990 
The Option Contract: Irrevocable Not Irrejectable 
Michael J. Cozzillio 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Michael J. Cozzillio, The Option Contract: Irrevocable Not Irrejectable, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 491 (1990). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol39/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
THE OPTION CONTRACT: IRREVOCABLE
NOT IRREJECTABLE
Michael J. Cozzillio *
Section 37 of the Second Restatement of Contracts states in pertinent part:
"Notwithstanding [Sections] 38 [to] 49, the power of acceptance under an
option contract is not terminated by rejection or counter offer, by revoca-
tion, or by death or incapacity of the offeror, unless the requirements are met
for the discharge of a contractual duty."'
This statement represents the majority position with respect to the possi-
ble termination of an option contract 2 by the rejection or counter offer of the
offeree/optionee. 3 However, the Restatement's approach and the concomi-
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I. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 37 (1979). Although this section is pur-
portedly derived from section 47 of Restatement (First), it represents a marked departure from
the original Restatement, which did not carve out special treatment for irrevocable offers or
option contracts. See id. § 37 reporter's note. In fact, section 47 involved termination by the
offeror alone, and in no way even referred to the ability of the offeree to terminate. Conse-
quently, section 37 is derivative only to the extent that it references the optionor's inability to
terminate, and it fails to establish even a historical justification for its premise. See RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 47 (1932).
2. The model arrangement envisioned as an option contract herein would simply involve
a promise by A to sell B a parcel of land for a fixed sum of money, with a collateral promise to
hold the offer open for a fixed period of time in exchange for some consideration (normally
much less than the price of the subject property). Of course, there are numerous variations on
this theme, many of which satisfy the broad definition of an option contract. See infra notes
57-64 and accompanying text.
3. For a comprehensive discussion of the majority and minority precedents, see infra
notes 78-175 and accompanying text. Further, this Article will discuss the functional
equivalent of a rejection and counter-offer at common law and possible points at which these
terms differ. See infra notes 7, 40-56 and accompanying text. Finally, the terms "optionee"
and "offeree" will be interchanged throughout this article.
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tant judicial authority misperceive the purposes underlying an option con-
tract. Moreover, they inappropriately vitiate application of traditional offer
and acceptance principles in the context of the rejection of an offer rendered
irrevocable by the securing of an option.4 An option contract generally cre-
ates an insulated time period within which the offeror surrenders his com-
mon law right to revoke prior to an acceptance. Yet, under no
circumstances should such irrevocability presume to foreclose the termina-
tion of the offeree's power of acceptance either by outright rejection or by a
counter-offer operating as a rejection.
An option contract should protect the optionee from an untimely revoca-
tion by the optionor, but should not operate to subvert traditional contract
principles with respect to the offeree's prerogative to terminate the offer.5 A
rejection or counter-offer that terminates a revocable offer should likewise
bar acceptance of an irrevocable offer.6
Under the approach advanced herein, for example, if A, for consideration,
extends an irrevocable offer to B for a designated period of time, and B re-
jects the offer outright, a subsequent acceptance, even one within the time
frame covered by the option, would be ineffective. The rejection would ter-
minate the offer, and the optionee's post hoc acceptance would represent
nothing more than a new offer. Certain counter-offers would also operate as
rejections and preempt subsequent acceptances.7
4. For example, some commentators suggest that the option contract, in effect, creates
an irrevocable offer and that courts should address issues arising under the option contract
under traditional offer and acceptance approaches. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
CONTRACTS § 2-25 (3d ed. 1987). These commentators quickly add that the rules change with
respect to termination of the irrevocable offer embraced in an option. Id. Yet, little satisfac-
tory explanation exists to explain why the rejection should not terminate the irrevocable offer
much the same as it aborts the power of acceptance of a revocable offer. The crux of the
problem lies in the option agreement's "dual nature" (i.e., both an offer and completed con-
tract) which has caused courts no small amount of difficulty. See, e.g., Palo Alto Town &
Country Village, Inc. v. BBTX Co., 11 Cal. 3d 494, 521 P.2d 1097, 113 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1974).
See further infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
5. See generally A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 3.10, 3.20 (1982); J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 4, § 2-20.
6. The option contract's predominant purpose is to "freeze" or "preserve" an offer for a
prearranged or reasonably inferred period of time. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying
text. Thus, those triggering devices that would terminate an offer rendered irrevocable by an
option clearly do not include revocation. However, the predicate for disqualifying rejection as
a terminator of an irrevocable offer has never been fully explicated; indeed, the conclusion thus
drawn defies logical analysis.
7. Traditionally, a counter-offer serves as a rejection of the offer and terminates the
power of acceptance because it reflects the offeree's unwillingness to accept the original terms
of the offer. By dint of the "mirror image" rule, any deviation from the letter of the offer will
render the offeree's response a nonacceptance and, under appropriate circumstances, a
counter-offer/rejection. See United States v. Marietta Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 18 (D. W. Va.
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Under the predominant view, a rejection terminates the offer only if the
original offeror has changed his position in reliance upon such rejection.'
However, this approach is far too limited and, in fact, represents the frailty
and counter-intuitive nature of the majority position.9 Indeed, requiring the
optionor to demonstrate reliance makes the option contract offer irrejectable
as well as irrevocable. Such a construction disserves the optionor who typi-
cally has only agreed to hold his offer open for a designated or reasonable
period of time, unless, of course, the parties to the option contract clearly
manifest in the option itself that the optionee's rejection will not terminate
the option, and the parties support this provision with consideration. More-
over, this oblique interpretation plainly distorts the rules of offer and accept-
1972); Gyurkey v. Babler, 103 Idaho 663, 651 P.2d 928 (1982); Radio Picture Show Partner-
ship v. Exclusive Int'l Pictures, 482 N.E.2d 1159 (Ind. App. I Dist. 1985); Rose v. Guerdon
Indust. Inc., 374 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. App. 1985); Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216
N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915), reh'g denied, 216 N.Y. 771, 111 N.E. 1098 (1916); A. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 5, §§ 3.13, 3.20, 3.21. But see infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
Admittedly, an approach that requires termination of the offer in the face of any response
varying slightly from such offer presents potentially harsh consequences, especially in the con-
text of option contracts. Therefore, this Article suggests a regime that represents broad adher-
ence to traditional contract principles governing offer and acceptance, with an attendant
sensitivity to the peculiar nuances of the option contract. Such an accommodation dictates
that not all counter-offers at common law should operate to terminate the irrevocable offer
notwithstanding any continuing vitality or smoldering vestige of the mirror image rule. Cer-
tainly, any proposed regime requiring termination of the irrevocable offer by rejection would
not apply to situations in which the offeror or offeree manifests an intent to retain the power to
accept notwithstanding the tendering of a counter-offer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 38(2) comment b, § 39 comments b & c (1979); Collins v. Thompson, 679 F.2d
168 (9th Cir. 1982); Radford & Guisne v. Practical Premium Co., 125 Ark. 199, 188 S.W.562
(1916); Katz v. Pratt St. Realty Co., 257 Md. 103, 262 A.2d 540 (1970). Likewise, the prof-
fered revision of section 37 would not include within its definition of counter-offer grumbling
acceptances, counter-inquiries, suggestions, requests for clarification, and similar responses
that do not manifest the offeree's intent to advance a substitute bargain. In truth, neither of
these examples would disturb even a strict application of the mirror image rule. Finally, how-
ever, in a clear departure from the mirror image rule, an optionee's response that constitutes a
definite and seasonable acceptance of all material terms, but includes additional or varied
terms, will not be deemed a counter-offer under the proposed revision of section 37. In this
sense, the proposed approach echoes section 2-207(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code and its
partial imitator, section 61 of the Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 61 (1979). See also A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 82 (1963). Of course,
any acceptance made conditional upon the offeror's assent to additional or varied terms will
constitute a counter-offer terminating the offeree's power of acceptance. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59 (1979); U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1977). In sum, this Article suggests
a revamping of section 37, but favors retaining the remaining provisions of the Second Restate-
ment as they pertain to the definitions of counter-offer and the abrogation of the mirror image
rule. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Ryder v. Wescoat, 535 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Axelrod, The
Effect of Rejection on the Option Contract, 6 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 415 (1981); Harding,
Contracts, 23 Sw. L.J. 113, 114 (1969). See infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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ance without adequate predicate in law and without the parties'
demonstrable agreement.' ° Most important, because the offer will lapse
upon expiration of the option period, the majority's position amounts to an
assertion that one cannot reject an option. That is, if the optionee (absent
the optionor's reliance) can recant his rejection any time within the option
period, and thus surrenders his acceptance prerogative only when the option
expires, "rejection" in the traditional sense of that term becomes a dysfunc-
tional concept.
This Article briefly examines the traditional contract principles governing
offer and acceptance, particularly the various means to terminate an offer. It
also explores the special circumstances governing option contracts and simi-
lar mechanisms utilized to transform a revocable offer into an irrevocable
one. Further, this Article reviews Restatement (Second) Section 37 and case
law that addresses the question of whether a rejection should terminate an
irrevocable offer. It explains why the view articulated by section 37 and its
decisional predicates are untenable. Finally, this Article presents an alterna-
tive to section 37 that reflects logical compliance with established contract
formation principles, while doing no violence to the legal and practical con-
siderations attending the creation of typical option contracts.
I. FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT
A. Offer and Acceptance Generally
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts broadly defines an offer as the
"manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify
another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and
will conclude it."'" Professor John Murray describes the offer/acceptance
scenario as a susceptibility-power relationship.' 2 The impact of an offer lies
in its grant to the offeree of the legal power to close the deal. When the
offeror extends the offer, he becomes susceptible to the offeree's ability to
10. Again, the questions governing the rejection and subsequent acceptance of an irrevo-
cable offer, or an offer embraced by an option contract, are properly matters of offer and
acceptance. However, in theory, the option contract may constitute an independent agreement
wherein the optionor assumes a duty not to revoke in exchange for the optionee's payment of
consideration. Therefore, some may posit that the rejection question requires analysis under a
performance approach. In this scenario, the rejection arguably is nothing more than a type of
waiver, ineffectual absent new and independent considertion. See infra notes 271-310 and ac-
companying text. Notwithstanding the technical feasibility of this argument, the option con-
tract functions as an irrevocable offer and all questions surrounding the acceptance or rejection
of such offer should be addressed under formation, not performance, principles. Id. More-
over, even under a performance analysis, the conclusions reached herein are undisturbed. Id.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1979).
12. J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 33 n.60 (3d ed. 1990).
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create a legally enforceable contract. Thus, Professor Murray employs the
phrase susceptibility-power rather than the traditional terminology "power-
liability." 3 Acceptance, the method of closing the circle of assent, simply
represents a "voluntary act of the offeree whereby he exercises the power
conferred upon him by the offer and thereby creates ... a contract."
1 4
Myriad problems emerge in ascertaining whether an offer is susceptible to
an acceptance or invites an act that will conclude the transaction.' 5 For
example, courts have wrestled perenially with the distinctions between true
offers and preliminary negotiations, physicians' opinions, and offers to ac-
cept offers. 6 Language of commitment, identity of the offeror and offeree,
and specificity in terms of quality, quantity, and overall description of the
goods or services illustrate some of the factors considered in drawing these
often subtle distinctions. 7 Other factors, such as an offeror's reservation of
the right to approve the ultimate "agreement," or suggestions by a putative
offeror that an offeree has no power to consummate the contract, may shed
light on the determination of whether a particular proposal rises to the level
of an offer. Yet, one cannot, without difficulty, predict the weight a court
will accord each factor in resolving these questions.' 8 To say that it will
13. Id. See also Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919).
14. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE
L.J. 169, 199 (1917).
15. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 3.6, 3.10.
16. See, e.g., Dooley v. West, 210 F. Supp. 239 (W.D. Ark. 1962); Hawkins v. McGee, 84
N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1921); Anderson v. Board of Pub. Schools, 122 Mo. 61, 27 S.W. 610
(1894); Millone Tucci v. BonaFide, 49 Wash. 2d 363, 301 P.2d 759 (1956).
17. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 2-5, 2-6.
18. Comprehensive research yields evidence that the differentiations are often quite artifi-
cial and of little predictive value. For example, in the context of newspaper advertisements,
compare Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 251 Minn, 188, 86 N.W.2d 689 (1957)
(newspaper advertisement qualified by the words: "First Come, First Served," found to be an
offer) with Craft v. Elder & Johnston Co., 38 N.E.2d 416 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941) (newspaper
advertisement held to be merely an invitation to deal). See also Glen Marshall, Inc. v. Purola-
tor Filter Div., 211 Neb. 306, 318 N.W.2d 284 (1982). Unfortunately, judicial opinions in this
area frequently reflect post hoc, outcome-determinative decision making with attendant infir-
mity in the offered rationale. Courts generally consider those factors listed above when at-
tempting to ascertain whether a particular proposal forms an offer rendering the offeror
susceptible to an acceptance, or merely constitutes a preliminary foray into the negotiation
process inviting no such acceptance. However, to suggest the application of any precise
formula to evaluate the relative strengths of each of those factors in a particular case is a
hopeless exercise. As Professor Murray has stated:
If a statement is sufficiently definite and there is a manifestation of commitment, a
promise designed to induce action or forbearance which the promisor desires, an
offer exists .... Even this reliable guide, however, must not be viewed algebraically
.... Two or more courts could apply the suggested guide to virtually identical fact
situations and arrive at opposite conclusions. There is no mathematical formula that
promises a certain and just result in all cases.
1990]
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vary from case to case or jurisdiction to jurisdiction vastly understates the
idiosyncratic methodology of differentiating an offer from a nonoffer.
Once a court concludes that an offeror has made an offer, the next step
entails identifying the character of the offer in order to determine whether a
particular response constitutes a valid acceptance.' 9 If an offer explicitly
seeks performance as its mode of acceptance, then generally a promise to
perform will not consummate the transaction.2" Similarly, the beginning of
performance ordinarily will not constitute an effective acceptance of an offer
that plainly seeks to elicit a promise.2' Of course, undertaking performance
may be deemed an implied promise to complete, especially where the partial
performance occurs in the presence of the offeror.22 Moreover, a large
J. MURRAY, supra note 12, § 34, at 73-74 (citations omitted); A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 23.
See also Harvey v. Facey, 62 L.J., P.C. 127, A.C. 552 (1893); Owen v. Tunison, 131 Me. 42,
158 A. 926 (1932).
19. Certain offers will invite promissory acceptance and others will invite acceptance by
performance. Moreover, a third category emerges, which, due to history, custom, or course of
performance, neither requires nor contemplates a response; there, the offeree's silence will con-
stitute acceptance. This last category is certainly rare, and does not contradict the basic con-
cept that silence is an inappropriate method or means of demonstrating acceptance. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1979).
20. Id. § 50 comment b § 32 comment b. See I S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 73, at 238-39 (3d ed. 1957 & Supp. 1989); L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS 46 (2d ed. 1965); see also Becker v. Missouri Dep't of Social Servs., 689
F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1982).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 53 (1979); see, e.g., Note, Acceptance by
Performance When the Offeror Demands A Promise, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1917 (1979); Allied
Steel & Conveyors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 277 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1960); see also Shortridge v.
Ghio, 253 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952). But see Vermillion v. Marvel Merchandising Co.,
314 Ky. 196, 234 S.W.2d 673 (1950) (beginning performance was sufficient to form a contract).
22. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 2-26 n.80. In a related sense,
even when the offer invites a promise as the method of acceptance, full performance effected
prior to expiration of the offer has been deemed to constitute a valid acceptance if accompanied
by appropriate notification. See generally S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, § 78A; RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1932), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 comment c
(1979). See also Allied Steel & Conveyors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 277 F.2d 907, 911 (6th Cir.
1960). Although notification of performance is not required in each and every case, generally
notification of an intent to accept by promise is required. Therefore, where the offer seeks only
a promise, and the offeree chooses to accept by performance, such performance should logi-
cally be an effective acceptance only if the offeree tendered the proper notification. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 54, 56, 63 (1979); Braucher, Offer and Acceptance
in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE L.J. 302, 308-09 (1964). Section 50 of the Second Re-
statement suggests that notification requirements, where performance constitutes an implied
return promise, may be governed by section 54, which would dispense with the need for notifi-
cation in most cases. However, this intimation seems to contradict comment b of section 54,
which explicitly states that "this Section applies only to offers which invite acceptance by
performance." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 54 comment b (1979). Of
course, the notice requirement may have nothing whatever to do with the acceptance of the
offer. It has been argued that, in many instances, the notice is a condition precedent to the
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number of cases involve situations where the offer is silent as to the mode of
acceptance or invites either type of acceptance. While the traditional ap-
proach presumes this type of offer to require a return promise, the modern
view permits the offeree to select the method of acceptance that he deems
appropriate.
23
B. Terminating the Offer and Aborting the Power of Acceptance:
Revocation and Rejection
Typically, several acts can terminate an offer, including, among others,
revocation by the offeror, 24 counter-offer 25 or outright rejection 26 by the of-
feree, the death of one of the parties, 27 the destruction of the subject matter
contained in the offer,28 and lapse of time.29 For purposes of this Article,
promisor's duty to perform, but does not constitute a necessary part of the acceptance. See
Murray, A New Design for the Agreement Process, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 785 (1968).
23. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 62 (1979) with Davis v. Jacoby,
1 Cal. 2d 370, 34 P.2d 1026 (1934). See also Note, supra note 21, at 1917.
24. The revocation manifests the offeror's intention to withdraw an offer and avoid enter-
ing a proposed contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 (1979).
25. Id. §§ 38, 39. See supra note 7.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 38 (1979). Burton v. Coombs, 557
P.2d 148 (Utah 1976). As discussed earlier, the counter-offer and rejection at common law are
functional equivalents insofar as the termination of the offer is concerned. See supra notes 6-7
and accompanying text. However, they are different concepts, as most dramatically evidenced
by the fact that the rejection does not always operate as a counter-offer, even though the true
and "unqualified" counter-offer always acts as a rejection. See A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 94;
A. COPPOLA, THE LAW OF BUSINESS CONTRACTS § 1.25 (1964). Further, under the ap-
proach proposed in this Article, there may be circumstances in the irrevocable offer context
where a typical counter-offer/rejection at common law should not operate to terminate an offer
in every case. See supra note 7; infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48 (1979). See also Jordan v. Dobbins,
122 Mass. 168 (1877). In Jordan, the court considered whether, in the context of a continuing
guarantee, the offer should terminate if the offeree (normally a creditor) was unaware of the
guarantor's death when he accepted. Id. at 169-70. The court concluded that, even without
such notice, the offer terminates upon the demise of the offeror/guarantor. Id. at 170. But see
Gay v. Ward, 67 Conn. 147, 34 A. 1025 (1895) (positing an infinitely more plausible rule). In
a related case involving the potential termination of an offer due to the offeror's intervening
incapacity by virtue of an adjudicated insanity, the court found the offeror's revocation ineffec-
tive without notice. See Swift & Co. v. Smigel, 60 N.J. 348, 289 A.2d 793 (1972).
Section 37 declares that death or incapacity of the offeree will not terminate an irrevocable
offer. While this Article does not embrace that assertion, see Biggins v. Shore, 365 Pa. Super.
237, 529 A.2d 487 (1987), aff'd, 365 A.2d 737 (1989), it submits that the situation is suffi-
ciently distinguishable from the issue at hand so as to require no extended discussion. Even if
section 37 articulates a legally tenable approach regarding death or incapacity, neither event
involves the deliberate and conscious manifestation of intent not to accept that is characteristic
of the rejection of an irrevocable offer. Thus, one may plausibly retain part of section 37,
permitting an optionee's heirs or assigns opportunity to accept under an option, while denying
an optionee the opportunity to accept after a rejection.
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 36 (1979).
1990]
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revocation by the offeror and the outright rejection or counter-offer/rejec-
tion by an offeree are the critical "terminators" of an offer. These issues
constitute the focal points of the discussion because this Article advances the
overriding premise that the option contract compromises the offeror's right
to revoke, yet in no way alters the rejection component of the offer/accept-
ance configuration.
1. Revocation
Most offers are presumed to be revocable at the will of the offeror, pro-
vided that the offeree has not already manifested his acceptance by some
effective means.3° Thus, even though the offeror has represented that a par-
ticular offer will remain open for a designated period of time, the offeror still
reserves the right to revoke the offer within that time period, barring an
effective acceptance.3" However, if the offeree has secured the offeror's
pledge of irrevocability by some exchange of consideration, or through some
rough equivalent, such as seal, detrimental reliance, or a statutory dispensa-
tion of the need for consideration, then that offer will remain open for the
period of time agreed to, or for a reasonable timeframe.3 2
Normally, an offeror must communicate notice of a revocation to protect
the offeree from detrimentally relying upon an offer that no longer exists.3 3
Thus, while an offeree's acceptance of an offer can be effective from the mo-
ment it leaves his possession (as in a situation where the parties invite mail-
ing as an appropriate mode of acceptance),3 4 revocation of an offer will not
be effective until the offeree receives it. The realization that the offeror is
technically the instigator of the transaction and invites the offeree's accept-
ance should quickly dispel any misgivings about this approach's apparent
29. Id, § 41. See also Loring v. City of Boston, 48 Mass. 409 (1844); Morrison v. Rayen
Inv. Inc., 97 Nev. 58, 624 P.2d 11 (1981); Textron, Inc. v. Parkview Equities, Inc., 552
N.Y.S.2d 750 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. Commercial Restora-
tion, Inc., 334 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
30. See A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 38.
31. Of course, under the deposited-acceptance rule, if an offeree mails an acceptance prior
to a lapse of time or the effective communication of the revocation, then that acceptance will
form a binding contract, assuming that the contract is valid in all other respects. See, e.g.,
Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng.
Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818). See infra notes 242-70 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Note, The Requirement ofa Definite Time Period in Option Contracts, 34 LA.
L. REV. 668 (1974); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1979). In the
resulting option contract, the deposited acceptance rule should become inoperative and the
ultimate acceptance should be effective upon receipt. See infra notes 259-70 and accompany-
in g te x t. ' 
' "
33. See generally L. & E. Wertheimer, Inc. v. Wehle-Hartford Co., 126 Conn. 30, 9 A.2d
279 (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 (1979).
34. See infra notes 242-58 and accompanying text.
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bias in favor of the offeree. Because the offer invites acceptance, the offeror
should assume that the offeree expects that acceptance to form a binding
contract. Moreover, the offeror should realize that an offeree will act in reli-
ance upon that logical assumption. By contrast, the offeree does not invite
the offeror to revoke and therefore has no reasonable belief that a revocation
is forthcoming until it actually arrives.35 As master of the offer, the offeror
may seek to restrict the method and time of acceptance and, theoretically,
may expressly reserve the right to revoke at will and without notice. 36 How-
ever, absent some outward manifestation of the offeror's intent to revoke,
some question exists as to whether this broad reservation of rights should
permit an uncommunicated revocation to bar an otherwise effective
acceptance.37
Under appropriate circumstances, indirect or constructive communication
of a revocation to an offeree may' terminate the offer. If an offeree possesses
knowledge from a reliable source that an offeror has contracted with a third
party concerning the same subject matter contained in the original offer, and
if the information is true, then such "indirect" revocation may operate to
terminate the offer. 3' This approach seems to place substance over form and
to give credence to an offeree's constructive knowledge that an offer no
longer exists.
Absent some agreement to forestall the offeror's power to revoke, the of-
feree is at the mercy of the offeror who chooses to terminate the offer prior to
an effective acceptance. An act by either party creating an option or other-
wise validly rendering an offer irrevocable, eliminates the offeror's ability to
35. See generally A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 39.
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 comment b (1979).
37. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 2-20(d). Of course, the
extent to which such a reservation of rights will permit an uncommunicated revocation will
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and will depend also upon whether the offeree effectively
dispatched an acceptance so as to close the circle of assent and preclude revocation. The
question becomes very complicated if the offeror has reserved a right to revoke without notice
and the offeree has mailed his acceptance in a jurisdiction embracing the mailbox rule. In any
event, it strains logic and credulity to permit an offeror effectively to reserve the right to revoke
without any indications to the offeree. It seems more intellectually honest simply to character-
ize an offer that reserves the right to revoke without notice as no offer at all.
38. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876). This case is not without its detrac-
tors. See also A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 40, at 167-71; Note, Recent Cases, 30 TEX. L. REV.
770, 771 (1952). Compare RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 42 (1932) (offer is revoked if,
prior to acceptance, offeree acquires reliable information that offeror has contracted to sell the
interest to another) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 43 (1979) (offeree's
power of acceptance terminates when he acquires reliable information that the offeror has
taken definite action inconsistent with an intention to enter into the proposed contract). But
see Butler v. Wehrley, 5 Ariz. App. 228, 425 P.2d 130 (1967).
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abort the offer until the designated period of irrevocability, or in the absence
thereof, a reasonable period of time, has elapsed. 9
2. Rejection
A rejection is essentially a "manifestation of intention not to accept an
offer," assuming that the offeree has demonstrated no intent to consider the
offer further. 4' A counter-offer is an "offer made by an offeree to his offeror
relating to the same matter as the original offer and proposing a substituted
bargain differing from that proposed by the original offer."'" A counter-
offer generally acts as a rejection and, absent qualifying language demon-
strating the offeror's or offeree's intent to reserve the acceptance prerogative,
will terminate the offer.4 2 As suggested above, an offeree's response that
deviates in any way from the offer will operate as a rejection at common law
and will vitiate the offeree's power of acceptance.4 3 Further, the offeree may
manifest an unconditional assent to the offer but simultaneously propose ad-
ditional or varied terms. Under the common law mirror image rule, these
additional terms that alter the proffered bargain compel the conclusion that
the offeree finds the original offer unacceptable.4 4 Finally, a conditional ac-
39. See generally Note, supra note 32, at 672-74.
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 38(2) (1979); see also supra note 7
and accompanying text.
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39(1) (1979); see also supra note 7
and accompanying text.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39(2) (1979). See also Collins v. Thomp-
son, 679 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1982).
43. See A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 3.13, 3.20, 3.21; Wagner v. Rainier Mfg. Co.,
230 Or. 531, 371 P.2d 74 (1962). The rule requiring a mirror image acceptance does not vary
with irrevocable offers. In both the revocable and irrevocable situations, the mirror image rule
persists at common law. See Landberg v. Landberg, 24 Cal. App. 3d 742, 101 Cal. Rptr. 335
(1972); Green v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 511 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); McCor-
mick v. Stephany, 61 N.J. Eq. 208, 48 A. 25 (1900). However, as suggested earlier, many
courts avoid strict application of the mirror image rule in both contexts by, inter alia, requiring
that modifications in the offeree's response be material before they will terminate the power of
acceptance. See, e.g., J. R. Stone Co. v. Keate, 576 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1978); Madison v. Mar-
latt, 619 P.2d 708 (Wyo. 1980); see also A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 82, at 349. See supra note
7 and accompanying text.
44. Of course, the mirror image rule is now a pale reflection of its former self. It has been
questioned by contract scholars, diluted by jurists, and vitiated by legislators. As several com-
mentators have suggested, the mirror image rule "has been enforced with a rigor worthy of a
better cause." See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 2-21, at 102. Further, several
courts have attempted to retrofit the rule and to mitigate its harshness by limiting it to situa-
tions in which the modifications of the offeree's terms are deemed material. See, e.g., Newspa-
per Readers Serv., Inc. v. Canonsburg Pottery Co., 146 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1945); Richardson v.
Greensboro Warehouse & Storage Co., 223 N.C. 344, 26 S.E.2d 897 (1943); J.R. Stone Co.,
Inc. v. Keate, 576 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1978); see also Pickett v. Miller, 76 N.M. 105, 412 P.2d 400
(1966). Similarly, additional or varied terms are sometimes characterized simply as "sugges-
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ceptance, which makes a purported acceptance of the offer dependent upon
the offeror's acquiescence to other terms, will also generally terminate the
offer even under the more progressive approaches denigrating the mirror im-
age rule.45
Thus, an offeree may terminate an offer by rejection in several ways, in-
cluding: outright rejection; implied rejection drawn from the offeree's
counter-offer; a qualified acceptance that purports to embrace the terms of
an offer but conditions such acceptance upon the incorporation of varied or
additional terms;46 and in some jurisdictions, an apparently unconditional
acceptance that includes varied or additional terms.
Yet, not all apparent counter-offers will act as rejections 47 terminating the
offeree's power of acceptance. If, for example, the offeror explicitly makes
tions" so as to preserve the acceptances and to avoid the strict requirement of a mirror image
response. See A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at § 3.21. The most dramatic example of legis-
lative abrogation of the mirror image rule is the codification of section 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1977). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 61 (1979); U.C.C. 2-207 (1977). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59 (1979), U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1977);
see also Bartholf v. Hautala, 22 Misc. 2d 46, 194 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); A.
CORBIN, supra note 7, § 82; L. SIMPSON, supra note 20, §§ 23-24.
46. With respect to acceptances that incorporate varied or additional terms, U.C.C. § 2-
207 has altered the playing field in the context of the sale of goods. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (1977).
Section 2-207 was adopted to remedy the negative effects of applying the mirror image rule to
sales of goods where the "Battle of the Forms" was constantly being waged. The "Battle of the
Forms" generally concerns the commercial occurrence wherein each party prepares a form
designed to give itself the maximum advantage in a commercial transaction. These forms are
exchanged as part of a contractual agreement (or as confirmation of an agreement already
formed) in which the principal terms are agreed to in full. However, under the mirror image
rule, if these forms contain terms that differ from the expressed terms of agreement, then the
agreement would be nullified because the acceptance does not unqualifiedly reflect the terms of
the offer. Section 2-207 was therefore developed to permit the formation of a contract notwith-
standing the existence of additional or varied terms in an acceptance - provided the "dick-
ered" or "material" terms (for example, price or quantity) were not in dispute. Section 2-207
also provides a mechanism to ascertain whether these additional terms should be embraced
into the body of the final agreement. See generally Barron & Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207."
Review, Reflection and Revision, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 171 (1975); Murray, The Article 2
Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASH-
BURN L.J. 1 (1981); Duesenberg, Contract Creation: The Continuing Struggle With Additional
and Different Terms Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207, 34 Bus. LAW 1477
(1979). While the development of section 2-207 was a positive step toward reconciliation of
the mirror image rule with well-recognized commercial exigencies, it has hardly been hailed as
a paragon of legislative draftsmanship. In fact, the critics seem to increase geometrically with
the passage of each year. See, e.g., Murray, The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms" Solutions,
39 VAND. L. REV. 1307 (1986); Thatcher, Battle of the Forms. Solution by Revision of Section
2-207, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 237 (1984); Travalio, Clearing the Air After the Battle: Reconciling Fair-
ness and Efficiency in a Formal Approach to UCC Section 2-207, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 327
(1983).
47. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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the offeree aware that a counter-offer will not destroy the offer, then the
offeree may tender such a counter-offer and yet subsequently accept the orig-
inal offer, assuming that the offer has not been otherwise terminated.48
Under prevailing objective theory, an offeror's clear manifestation of intent
to indulge counter-offers, and to maintain the vitality of the offer in the face
of such counter-offers, will preserve the offeree's power of acceptance
notwithstanding any intervening posturing.49 Moreover, if the offeree ap-
prises the offeror of an intent to continue negotiations and a desire to keep
the original offer under consideration, then the counter-offer accompanying
the "reservation of rights" may properly be viewed as mere intermediate
negotiations and not a rejection of the original offer.5°
Further, acceptances that raise further inquiries, comment negatively on
the offer, or request a better offer do not necessarily constitute conditional
acceptances or counter-offers containing varied terms.5" Rather, these re-
sponses simply represent types of grumbling acceptances that do not pre-
sume to present a substitute bargain in any way, but merely place the world
on notice that the acceptor would be happier with a somewhat different deal.
Clearly, the key in this latter context is to assess whether the additional term
proposes a new contract, demonstrating dissatisfaction with the terms (some
would say "material terms") of the original offer, or constitutes an accept-
ance conditional upon the offeror's assent to the new terms - both of which
would negate the offeree's power to accept.
In any event, the outright rejection or the counter-offer/rejection does not
become effective until communicated to the offeror.52 Thus, while accept-
ance generally becomes effective upon dispatch, a rejection will only termi-
nate an offer upon receipt.53 Therefore, under a scenario in which the
offeree mails an acceptance and subsequently recants, the acceptance will
close the circle of assent even though the offeror's receipt of the rejection
48. Id.
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39 comment c (1979); see also J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 2-20(e), at 98; Quinn v. Feaheny, 252 Mich. 526, 233
N.W. 403 (1930).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39 comment c (1979). See, e.g., Collins
v. Thompson, 679 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1982); Radford & Guise v. Practical Premium Co., 125
Ark. 199, 188 S.W. 562 (1916); see also L. SIMPSON, supra note 20, § 24.
51. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39 comment b (1979); A.
CORBIN, supra note 7, § 84; see also Katz v. Pratt St. Realty Co., 257 Md. 103, 262 A.2d 540
(1970); Johnson v. Federal Union Sur. Co., 187 Mich. 454, 153 N.W. 788 (1915); Mall Tool
Co. v. Far W. Equip. Co., 45 Wash. 2d. 158, 273 P.2d 652 (1954).
52. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 40 (1979); Glacier Park
Found. v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1981).
53. See Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). See infra notes
242-59 and accompanying text.
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antedates the receipt of the acceptance. These generalizations are qualified
by significant exceptions. For example, estoppel may bar the enforcement of
the subsequent contract if the offeror has detrimentally relied on the rejec-
tion.54 Further, and of greater significance, the "mailbox rule" should not
operate in the option contract setting where time typically is "of the essence"
and acceptance is only effective upon receipt, barring contrary manifesta-
tions of intent by the offeror." As discussed below, the most plausible ra-
tionale to support this latter exception is that an option contract/irrevocable
offer insulates the optionee from an unanticipated revocation. Accordingly,
the offeree does not need the additional protection that the deposited accept-
ance rule provides.56
II. THE OPTION CONTRACT
A. United with or Apart from the Underlying Contract
In the typical option contract, the optionor, generally in exchange for
some consideration,57 gives the optionee a designated or reasonable time-
frame within which to reject or accept the offer. 8 While the optionor may
not revoke during the designated period, the optionee need not exercise the
option and may abandon the transaction at any time. 9 Thus, the optionee
may evaluate market conditions and other variables without risking injury
from the Damoclean sword of spontaneous revocation hanging overhead.
Commentators have characterized the option contract as a separate agree-
ment or a contract "preliminary to another one; that is, a contract entered in
contemplation of another contract that may come into existence later if the
54. See E. Frederics, Inc. v. Felton Beauty Supply Co., 58 Ga. App. 320, 198 S.E. 324
(1938).
55. See infra notes 259-70 and accompanying text. See generally Note, Option Contracts
and Rights of First Refusal. Disposing of the Deposit Acceptance Rule, 11 STETSON L. REV.
523 (1982).
56. See infra notes 259-70 and accompanying text.
57. Generally, only an offeree's payment of some consideration will convert a revocable
offer into an irrevocable one, unless seal, statute, or other similar device effects the change by
operation of law. See generally A. CORBIN, supra note 7, §§ 262-264; F. JAMES, OFTION
CONTRACTS § 838 (1916); Litvinoff, Consent Revisited, 47 LA. L. REV. 699 (1987). At times,
the consideration is minimal but while the negligible consideration may affect issues collateral
to the option agreement, questions of adequacy generally will not impact the securing of the
irrevocability option. See infra notes 233-36, 296-304 and accompanying text; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1979). Regarding the minimal consideration that often sup-
ports an irrevocable offer, see also A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 263; Litvinoff, supra, at 749-50.
58. See Note, supra note 32. See also Litvinoff, supra note 57, at 748-49.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 45, 87 (1979). See also F. JAMES,
supra note 57, § 838. "The option grants [him] the right to accept or reject the offer in accord-
ance with its terms, within the time and in the manner specified in the option." S. WILLISTON,
supra note 20, § 61B.
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grantor so elects."'6 For example, A offers to sell property to B for
$200,000; and, in a separate transaction, A offers to hold the offer open for a
set time period in exchange for $10,000. This type of option contract has its
own formation stage and consideration requirement; thus, there is an ele-
ment of individuality distinguishing it from the underlying contract offer.
However, the option contract generally is not separate and distinct in opera-
tion. Rather, it is wed to the offer-in-chief, rendering it irrevocable.6
Other types of options may swallow the underlying offer into a single
transaction - such as a promise by A to sell property to B for $200,000,
amount payable within a set period of time, held open by a payment (consid-
eration) of $10,000. In this type of situation, the parties establish a unilat-
eral contract with the payment of the $200,000 constituting a condition
precedent to A's duty to convey the property.62 While this example differs
from the model presented earlier and may suggest a somewhat atypical sce-
nario, it nonetheless represents a type of option contract.
The determination of whether the option contract embraces the underly-
ing offer or stands apart as a collateral precursor to the underlying offer will
turn on the facts of each case. In most instances, the distinction arises from
academic curiosity rather than functional significance. The effect in both
situations is normally the same: the option renders the underlying offer ir-
60. Litvinoff, supra note 57, at 745.
61. See, e.g., A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 262; J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4,
§ 2-25.
62. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 2-25. Moreover, these scenarios by no
means encompass every option contract configuration; one can easily derive additional unilat-
eral and bilateral models. One court offered this paradoxical definition of an option contract,
which incorporates both the dual contract and single contract ideas:
[Ain option agreement is a contract distinct from the contract to which the option
relates, since it does not bind the optionee to perform or enter into the contract upon
the terms specified in the option .... The creation of the final contract requires no
promise or other action by the optionor, for the contract is completed by the accept-
ance of the irrevocable offer of the optionor by the optionee. 'The contract has al-
ready been made, as far as the optionor is concerned, but it is subject to conditions
which are removed by the acceptance.'
Warner Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766, 772, 192 P.2d 949, 951-52 (1948) (quoting
Seeburg v. El Royale Corp., 54 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4, 128 P.2d 362, 363 (1942)). See also Palo
Alto Town & Country Village, Inc. v. BBTC, Co., 11 Cal. 3d 499, 521 P.2d 1097, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 705 (1974); A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 43.
Of course, the option often constitutes only part of a larger agreement, such as a provision
giving a lessee the opportunity to renew a lease or purchase the property that is the subject of
the lease. See, e.g., Ledford v. Atkins, 413 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1967).
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revocable for a fixed or reasonable period of time.63 Likewise, improvident
revocation would command the same remedial disposition in either case.
64
B. Bilateral or Unilateral
Whether the option contract itself is bilateral or unilateral has sparked no
small amount of scholarly debate. Professor Corbin declares that an option
contract can assume either form.65 Professor Williston differs, stating that
an option agreement by its own definition necessarily represents "a unilateral
contract.",66 However, Corbin's argument that the option arrangement can
form either a unilateral or bilateral contract depending upon the parties' out-
ward manifestations of intent staunchly resists dispute. For example, if A
promises to keep an offer open in exchange for B's payment of $500 or,
alternatively, for B's promise to pay $500, then the parties create an option
upon the occurrence of either event. Thus, the option contract can be unilat-
eral (if B tenders payment pursuant to an offer that seeks performance) or
bilateral (if A receives a promise pursuant to an offer that sought such a
63. In most instances, irrevocable offers unsupported by consideration or some statutory
validation are not actually irrevocable. However, when an offeree has paid the requisite con-
sideration, or when the pertinent statutory validation (for example, U.C.C. § 2-205) intervenes,
the offer then becomes irrevocable and the term "option contract" is employed to describe the
result. Hence, the oft-perceived fungibility of the two terms is born. See J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 4, § 2-25, at 121-23. But see Litvinoff, supra note 57, at 715, 747-48. This
point does not demean attempts to differentiate irrevocable offers from option contracts and to
draw distinctions among various types of options. Differences may exist depending upon the
nature of the agreement reached by the parties and pertinent statutory prescriptions. Id. at
747-48, 750-51, 753; see also McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27 HARv. L. REV. 644 (1914).
Much of the debate centers upon the perceived differentiation between the power to revoke and
the right to revoke, particularly the availability of specific performance as a remedy for im-
proper revocation. See C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 178 (1880);
McGovney, supra, at 657. Yet, modern commentators tend to discredit the exercise, sug-
gesting that the legal operation in most cases is the same. See A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 262.
See also J. MURRAY, supra note 12, § 43B. For purposes of this Article, the negligible opera-
tional differences between an irrevocable offer and an option contract do not warrant extended
discourse. Accordingly, the remainder of this Article will assume the interchangeability of the
words "option contract" and "irrevocable offer." See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note
4, § 2-25 at 124.
64. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. As Professor Corbin states:
The present writer is convinced that their legal operation is identical .... In both [the
conditional contract and the irrevocable offer], a notice of revocation ... would be a
breach of contractual duty, and a cause of action .... [A]n acceptance after revoca-
tion would create a right and duty of immediate performance, enforceable by the
usual contract remedies of damages, restitution, and specific performance. In both
cases alike, [optionee's] right to specific performance could be blocked by [optionor],
by transferring the property to an innocent purchaser for value.
A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 262.
65. Id. § 260.
66. S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, § 61(b).
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promise).67 Of course, in one sense, the resulting option arrangement is uni-
lateral or "one-sided": The optionor cannot escape, while the optionee has
an unfettered choice. Yet, to characterize categorically an option as a "uni-
lateral" contract, without ascertaining the nature of the option arrangement
is inappropriate.68
C. Constructive Option Contracts
Of course, not all option contracts are products of the parties' conscious
design. In certain unilateral and bilateral contract contexts, courts have im-
posed a type of option contract construct in an effort to place the parties in
the most equitable position and to reinforce their logical expectations. 69 For
example, when an offer invites an offeree to accept by performance, and pre-
cludes promissory acceptance, a court may find a constructive option con-
tract created by the offeree's beginning the invited performance. Partial
performance becomes the functional equivalent of the consideration paid in a
classic option contract - it freezes the offer for a reasonable period of time
and precludes the offeror from revoking, even though the requested perform-
ance remains inchoate.
70
67. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 2-25. Similarly, the "underlying
offer" (made irrevocable by the option) may invite either an acceptance by performance or by
promise. Id. In a variation on this theme, Professor Corbin has noted that "it is possible that
in a single contract both parties shall have an option", operating as a "bilateral contract, bind-
ing on both parties and not revocable by either." See A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 260. See also
Valashinas v. Koniuto, 308 N.Y. 233, 124 N.E.2d 300 (1954).
68. This exercise amply demonstrates that the terms "unilateral" and "bilateral" are
dated and rapidly falling into desuetude. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 1-10
n.66. The modem tendency is to employ terminology such as "offer seeking performance" and
"offer seeking a promise" rather than unilateral and bilateral. Despite the semantic problem
that may be created, this Article will, at times, use the terms unilateral and bilateral contract
as much from force of habit as from a desire to accommodate the terminology employed by the
cited cases.
69. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1979); Marchiondo v.
Scheck, 78 N.M. 440, 432 P.2d 405 (1967). Viewing partial performance in a unilateral con-
tract setting as the functional equivalent of consideration in the classic option contract setting
represents a more intelligent approach than the extreme, restrictive, and often inequitable al-
ternative of limiting acceptance to full performance, see Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N.Y. 86,
161 N.E. 428 (1928), or, equally unsatisfying, allowing the beginning of performance to serve
as a de facto promise to complete. See Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67
P. 1086 (1902). See also Ballantine, Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts by Partial
Performance of Service Requested, 5 MINN. L. REV. 94, 97 (1921). Intellectual infirmities
undermine both of these alternatives. In the former, the offeror would retain the right to
revoke after an offeree has expended at least some effort to complete. In the latter, partial
performance will be deemed a promise, where the offer in no way indicated that it would
indulge a promissory acceptance and the offeree made no manifestation of intent to assume a
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More remarkably, courts occasionally engraft an irrevocability component
onto an offer that seeks a promissory acceptance, even where an offeror
manifests no desire to surrender his revocation prerogative. A classic illus-
tration of this rather unusual phenomenon involves subcontractor bidding in
the construction industry. In Drennan v. Star Paving,7 1 the California
Supreme Court interpreted a bid arrangement between a subcontractor and
a general contractor as an option contract, irrevocable by the subcontractor
for a reasonable period of time.72 The court reasoned that the subcontrac-
tor's bid, upon which the general contractor based his proposal to the
"owner," constituted a promise begetting an additional implied promise of
temporary irrevocability.73 The court elected the option configuration in
this situation because the general contractor necessarily could not submit its
proposal to the "owner" unless he could securely rely upon the subcontrac-
tor's bid. Indeed, a spontaneous revocation by the subcontractor would un-
fairly vitiate part of the basis upon which the general contractor prepared his
bid to the owner. Thus, employing a promissory estoppel rationale, the
court allowed the general contractor's reliance to suspend the subcontrac-
tor's ability to revoke much the same as traditional consideration cements
the irrevocability of an offer in an option contract of the parties' design.74
binding commitment. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 2-22. As Professor
Ballentine suggests:
It is certainly not contemplated by the parties that the [unilateral] offer should be
revoked in the midst of performance; the injustice of that is at once felt. The sugges-
tion has been made to protect the offeree, that there is an implied ... promise con-
tained in such an offer to hold it open for a reasonable time .... This theory reaches
a just and desireable result.
Ballantine, supra, at 97 (footnote omitted).
The problem assumes greater compexity when, for example, the offeror extends a unilateral
offer to an option contract and the offeree partially performs. The offeree may argue, probably
unsuccessfully, that the partial performance constitutes acceptance or, incredibly, that the offer
of irrevocability (i.e., the option contract offer) is itself made irrevocable at least for a reason-
able period of time. In essence, a three-tiered construction could result, creating an option
contract within an option contract. In this narrow context, a better and infinitely more plausi-
ble rule would be that notwithstanding the modem approach to partial performance in re-
sponse to a unilateral contract offer, the optionee must tender consideration in full, and effect
total performance as a prerequisite to the perfection of the option contract. Absent full per-
formance or a promise to perform when the offeror invites one, no option exists, and the of-
feror can revoke the original offer at will. See, e.g., Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N.Y. 86, 161
N.E. 428 (1928); see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 263 comment b (1932).
71. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
72. Id. at 411, 333 P.2d at 760.
73. Id., 333 P.2d at 760.
74. Id., 333 P.2d at 760. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 45, 87
(1979). Cf James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). Arguably, the
Drennan approach exceedingly tilts in favor of the general contractor/offeree. Presumably, the
court could have achieved the same result by requiring that the general contractor accept the
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Balancing the equities, the court also indicated that any attempt by the gen-
eral contractor to obtain a better deal would compromise his option and
subject him to the subcontractor's prompt revocation of the offer.75
Admittedly, the offeror in the constructive option situation has not inten-
tionally surrendered his prerogative to revoke as does a typical option con-
tractor. Rather, the court removes that prerogative forcefully. Further, the
offeree may freely reject even after beginning performance. Nonetheless,
conventional wisdom dictates that the offeror should evoke little sympathy
largely because he sits as the master of the offer and presumably can demand
the more prevalent and predictable promissory acceptance to avoid the prob-
lem. Yet, even if an offeror seeks a promissory acceptance, courts in limited
circumstances, such as the Drennan situation, have sought to avoid injustice
by prohibiting an offeror from revoking for at least a reasonable period of
time.76 In any event, whether the offeror seeks performance or a promise,
the prudently employed constructive option allows courts to fortify the rea-
sonable expectations of an offeree without imposing a binding contract upon
the parties against their will.
Thus, the option contract can be the product of the parties' clear inten-
tions or judicial construction. It may be unilateral or bilateral, depending
upon the manifest objectives of the parties. Finally, it may be viewed as
either a separate agreement, preliminary to the offer in chief, or as part of a
larger agreement, in both events narrowing the revocability prerogative of
the offeror. For purposes of examining an offeree's ability to accept an op-
tion-secured offer within the option period after having rejected the offer,
this Article will assume that the typical option contract and irrevocable offer
are functional equivalents.77 Needless to say, such an assumption carries a
subcontractor's offer, making such acceptance expressly conditional upon its own successful
job bid. If its own bid failed, it would owe no duty to the subcontractor. If the "owner"
accepted its bid, then the general contractor's promise would bind him to the subcontrator.
See James Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 343.
75. Drennan, 51 Cal. 2d at 411, 333 P.2d. at 760. See infra note 181.
76. Drennan provides a typical example of courts seeking to do justice by forging an al-
loyed contract from the reconnected parts. 51 Cal.2d at 409, 333 P.2d at 757.
77. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 37 (1979). Section 37 permits the rejection to terminate the power of accept-
ance if it satisfies the requirements "for the discharge of a contractual duty." Id. This phrase-
ology suggests that the option contract, as a completed transaction, may be subject to a
different analysis than an "irrevocable offer," particularly insofar as the "rejection" of the
option is concerned. It is submitted that this wording, to the extent that it broadly distin-
guishes all option contracts and irrevocable offers, is infelicitous and perpetuates the faulty
assumption underlying the majority position - that the rejection of an option is a subject of
inquiry under a "performance analysis." See infra notes 280-310 and accompanying text.
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caution that peculiar option arrangements, varying significantly from the
models presented herein, may command divergent analyses.
III. THE MAJORITY: NEITHER OUTRIGHT REJECTIONS NOR TRUE
COUNTER-OFFERS OPERATE TO TERMINATE AN OFFER TO AN
OPTION CONTRACT
A. McCormick v. Stephany
The majority of courts and scant scholarship examining whether outright
rejections or counter-offers terminate an offer in an option contract setting
choose to adhere to the Second Restatement's reasoning that neither event
terminates the offeree's power of acceptance.7" One of the earliest cases ad-
dressing this issue involved the application of a lease provision that provided
the lessee an option to purchase land for a specified price within a delineated
timeframe.7 9 The option clause declared:
And it is further agreed by and between the above parties that, in
case the said party of the first part should find a purchaser for the
said premises, then the said party of the second part shall have the
option, during the continuance of this lease, to buy [from] the said
party of the first part the said premises for the sum of twelve thou-
sand dollars.8 0
The parties made this "option" "i effective for a specified period of time
8 2
and supported it with consideration.8 3 Pursuant to the option, the lessee
78. Professor Axelrod has divided the majority case authority into discrete discussions of
pure rejections of, and counter-offers to, options. See Axelrod, supra note 8, at 424-30. Yet, in
the final analysis, Axelrod draws no real distinctions between the two concepts, and points to
no case analysis explicitly differentiating them in any meaningful fashion. Id. Thus, one can
certainly draw the inference that there is no functional distinction between a true counter-offer
and a rejection in this context. Most courts and commentators seem to conclude that neither
event serves to terminate the irrevocable offer. See infra notes 110-13, 117-21 and accompany-
ing text. But see Cerbo v. Carabello, 376 Pa. 571, 103 A.2d 908 (1954) (the court intimated
that the absence of any manifestation of an intent to reject by the optionee reinforced its con-
clusion regarding the continuing vitality of the offer notwithstanding the counter-offer). In
any event, this discussion assumes that Restatement Second section 37 and the majority posi-
tion roughly equate rejections and true counter-offers.
79. McCormick v. Stephany, 61 N.J. Eq. 208, 48 A. 25 (1900).
80. Id. at 210, 48 A. at 27.
81. This "option" actually had the properties of a right of first refusal. See infra notes
155, 167.
82. Most option contracts do remain open for a designated period of time. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 32, at 673. See also Clark v. Dixon, 254 So. 2d 482 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (holding the
option invalid because it lacked a definite time period).
83. In McCormick, the court found the requisite consideration in the rental payments that
the parties incorporated into the lease proper. 61 N.J. Eq. at 211, 48 A. at 28. In this regard,
some authority exists for the proposition that courts may presume the existence of considera-
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requested a "deed with full covenants,",1 4 beyond the purchase agreement's
strict requirements. The lessor refused to provide the deed with such full
covenants and disclaimed any duty to the lessee by selling the property in
question to another party.85 The lessee's executrix sued for breach of con-
tract and demanded specific performance.8 6 In defense, the lessor remon-
strated that the lessee's demand for full covenants altered the terms of the
offer and thereby constituted nothing more than a counter-offer.' 7 The les-
sor urged the court to find that the lessee had rejected the offer or, alterna-
tively, had waived her rights to accept the original option contract terms at a
later date. 8 Thus, the lessee arguably forfeited the privilege to accept the
offer rendered irrevocable by the lease payment/consideration.
While acknowledging the "indisputable" case authority that an "accept-
ance of an option must meet the proffered contract in every respect, ' 8 9 the
court refused to disqualify the lessee from timely exercising the option after
she had tendered the qualified acceptance:
Such an agreement to convey is not a mere unaccepted proffer
based upon no consideration, as is a letter offering to sell, nor is it a
naked promise to sell at a price within a limited time. It is a com-
pleted purchase of a right to have a conveyance if the purchaser
shall choose to buy upon the terms named. In such case there is no
question of the arrival of the parties at a common intent. They
have already made a contract upon consideration paid, by which
the owner is bound to convey whenever the condition happens and
the making of a counter proposal to him does not enable him to
retain the consideration paid, and to declare the contract
forfeited. 90
Having thus characterized the option contract, the court concluded that:
"[i]f the transaction was a mere proffer, it might be withdrawn before accept-
ance; but when it was a contract for consideration paid, the party obligated
tion in such a context. See Braten v. Baker, 78 Wyo. 273, 275, 323 P.2d 929, 931 (1958);
Madison v. Marlatt, 619 P.2d 708, 714 (Wyo. 1980).
84. McCormick, 61 N.J. Eq. at 208, 211, 48 A. at 25, 28. The purchase agreement did not
include a deed "with full covenents free of all incumbrances." Id. at 208, 48 A. at 25.
85. Id. at 211, 48 A. at 28.
86. Id. at 208, 48 A. at 25.
87. Id., 48 A. at 25.
88. Id. at 211, 48 A. at 28.
89. Id. at 211, 48 A. at 28. See also Hutcheson v. Cronin, 426 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1968) ("The acceptance of an option, to be effectual, must be unqualified, absolute, un-
conditional, unequivocal, unambiguous, positive, without reservation, and according to the
terms of the option.").
90. Id. at 211, 48 A. at 28-29 (citing Page v. Martin, 46 N.J. Eq. 585, 20 A. 46 (1890)).
See also Bartholf v. Hautala, 22 Misc. 2d 46, 48, 194 N.Y.S.2d 660, 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
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to sell, if required, could not withdraw pending acceptance." 9' Accordingly,
the court held that the lessor's offer to sell retained vitality as to the lessee
until the expiration of the option period, notwithstanding the lessee's earlier
counter-offer/rejection.
92
B. Tracy v. O'Neill
Several years later, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in Tracy v. O'Neill, 93
reinforced McCormick in a case roughly paralleling our model. In Tracy,
the seller (through a broker) gave the buyer an option to purchase real estate
(and, derivatively, gave the broker the option to sell the same real estate at a
five percent commission) in consideration of a five dollar deposit.94 The
terms of the option made the offer irrevocable for a period of six days.
Within the stated period, the buyer indicated a desire to purchase the prop-
erty, but countered with additional terms governing the inclusion of certain
plumbing fixtures arguably not a part of the original offer. 95 When the seller
declined to convey the property under the new terms, the buyer, still within
the option period, accepted the offer as initially presented. The seller then
refused to close the transaction unless the buyer specifically addressed the
additional terms and explicitly excluded the plumbing fixtures in question.
96
The seller obviously believed that the buyer's counter-offer had terminated
the offer and negated the offeree's power of acceptance. Accordingly, when
the broker demanded his commission for closing the deal, the seller claimed
that the parties had not signed a contract for sale and that no duty to sell
had been triggered. The court categorically rejected the seller's defense and
found the offer vulnerable to the buyer's acceptance prerogative during the
entire term of the option, even in the face of the intervening counter-offer.
97
Therefore, the court sustained the broker's claim for commission by charac-
terizing the legal relationship between seller and buyer as one in which "the
defendant [seller] was bound to the plaintiffs to sell the property .,98
91. Id. at 211, 48 A. at 29. See also Axelrod, supra note 8, at 421.
92. McCormick, 61 N.J. Eq. at 211, 48 A. at 28. Again, it appears as though this court
freely interchanged the terms counter-offer and rejection without distinction, ignoring the pos-
sible impact of the distinction upon the offeree's power of acceptance. See infra notes 110-13
and accompanying text.
93. 103 Conn. 693, 131 A. 417 (1925).
94. Id. at 698, 131 A. at 419.
95. Id. at 696, 131 A. at 418.
96. Id., 131 A. at 418.
97. Id. at 698, 131 A. at 419.
98. Id. at 696, 131 A. at 418. At least one court has applied the same rationale where a
prospective purchaser made an irrevocable offer to a broker to consummate a transaction for
the purchase of real property. Tennent v. Leary, 82 Ariz. 67, 308 P.2d 693 (1957). In Ten-
nent, a buyer gave a real estate broker a brief period of time in which to obtain seller's accept-
1990]
Catholic University Law Review
This decision, together with McCormick v. Stephany,99 formed part of the
basis for Professor Corbin's assertion that an offeree's counter-offer within a
binding option, or similar negotiation not culminating in a contract, neither
terminates the offer nor negates the offeree's power to accept."° As Corbin
bluntly declared: "If the original offer is an irrevocable offer, creating in the
offeree a 'binding option,' the rule that a counter-offer terminates the power
of acceptance does not apply."' '°
C. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Westside Investment Corp.
Several cases decided in the past 30 years reinforce Professor Corbin's
approach and suggest that the established period of time secured by an op-
tion amounts to a sacrosanct window of opportunity within which the of-
feree can reject and recant with impunity.° 2 In one of the more celebrated
ance of an offer to secure certain real property. Id. at 70, 308 P.2d at 695. The buyer's
principal offer to purchase the property at a set price embraced the brokerage agreement. The
seller rejected the offer and presented a counter-offer to the buyer. Id. at 70, 308 P.2d at 696.
But, within the option period, the seller accepted the buyer's original offer. Id. at 71, 308 P.2d
at 696. The court rejected the buyer's claim for return of earnest money paid to the broker and
found that the seller's initial counter-offer did not abort the transaction:
That [seller's] tounter-offer to Tennent's offer to purchase his property was in law a
rejection of [buyer's] offer there can be no doubt. This did not, however, affect in
anywise [buyer's] written authorization to [broker] to continue to negotiate with
[seller] for the purchase of said property upon the terms of his written offer ...
There could not possibly be any legal efficacy in requiring the same offer to be rewrit-
ten before submitted.
Id. at 72, 308 P.2d at 696 (citing Hargrave v. Heard Inv. Co., 56 Ariz. 77, 105 P.2d 520
(1940)).
99. 61 N.J. Eq. 208, 48 A. 25 (1900).
100. A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 91. "A binding option is a standing offer as well as a
contract." Id. § 43. Ostensibly, the proponents of the majority view presume that because an
offer is standing, it is also one which is impervious to the conduct and intentions of the op-
tionee. However, in its purest sense, the option stands for the duration of the option period
only in the absence of action by the optionee. For example, the option ceases to stand upon
acceptance, when the option immediately becomes exercised. See infra notes 185-99 and ac-
companying text. If the option truly stood for the duration of the option period, an acceptance
would be effectively postponed until the end of the option period.
101. A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 43.
102. See, e.g., Ryder v. Wescoat, 535 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Sunray Oil Co. v.
Lewis, 434 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); Silverstein v. United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n, 232
N.Y.S.2d 968, 17 A.D.2d 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962); Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d
392 (1976); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Westside Inv. Corp., 428 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. 1968).
In Silverstein, a New York court, relying upon no precedent other than Professor Corbin's
prescription, declared:
[T]he irrevocable offer is not deemed rejected and cancelled out by mere counter-
proposals or negotiations not culminating into any agreement between the parties.
Absent a new agreement, express or implied, or facts and circumstances creating an
estoppel, the irrevocable offer continues during and survives the making of a counter-
proposal and dicussions in connection therewith.
[Vol. 39:491
The Option Contract
cases supporting this view, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. .Westside Invest-
ment Corp.,10 3 the Texas Supreme Court held that an option holder's
counter-offer did not terminate the power of acceptance and that a subse-
quent unconditional acceptance of the offer formed a binding contract. " In
Humble Oil, the seller and buyer had entered into an option contract
whereby the seller gave the buyer an exclusive and irrevocable option to
purchase a tract of land.'0 5 Consideration secured the option agreement for
a fixed duration of sixty days.'0 6 Approximately thirty days prior to the
expiration of the option period, the buyer sent the following communique to
seller, purporting to accept the offer but clearly inserting some of his own
terms: "[Buyer] ... hereby exercises its option to purchase .... As addi-
tional inducement for [buyer] to exercise its option to purchase, you have
agreed that all utilities (gas, water, sewer and electricity) will be extended to
the property prior to the closing of the transaction."'o 7
Within two weeks, however, buyer apprised seller of its intention to exer-
cise the option unconditionally and purchase the land in question. This noti-
fication explicitly advised the seller that he could "disregard the proposed
amendment to the contract" requested in the earlier correspondence.' 8 The
seller refused to convey the parcel premised on the fact that the conditional
acceptance/counter-offer constituted a rejection terminating the option and
aborting the offer.'0 9
Two Texas lower courts granted the seller's motion for summary judg-
ment, finding that the parties had not consummated a contract." 0 Revers-
232 N.Y.S.2d at 971, 17 A.D.2d at 162. Again, although the court intimated that it was
directing its attention to counter-offers, it made no attempt to differentiate the counter-offer
from the outright rejection here any more than most other cases addressing this question. Id.
at 971-72, 17 A.D.2d at 163. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text. Yet, at least one
court has construed the Silverstein opinion as creating a clear line of demarcation between
counter-offers and rejections in this context: "[I]n fact, in Silverstein, the court specifically
noted that an option, unlike an ordinary revocable offer, is not considered rejected by counter-
offers, but only by express rejection." Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Marquette Bank, 295
N.W.2d 89, 92 n.4. (Minn. 1980).
103. 428 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. 1968).
104. Id. at 95.
105. Id. at 93.
106: Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (emphasis omitted). Clearly, at this point, the offeree/optionee had tendered an
unequivocal acceptance of the offer and had withdrawn any reservations articulated earlier.
The question thus joined was whether the earlier counter-offer terminated the option contract.
Id. at 94.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 93; Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Westside Inv. Corp., 419 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1967), rev'd, 428 S.W.2d 92 (1968). One of the Texas lower courts adopted the precise
approach posited herein:
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ing these decisions, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the option was
an "independent completed agreement" providing the optionee the preroga-
tive "to purchase the property within the time specified."'1 The court rea-
soned that the buyer had expended "valuable consideration" for the "right
to keep the option contract open for the time specified" and "[a]lthough
[buyer] did have the right to accept or reject the option in the sense that it
was free to take the action required to close the transaction, [buyer] was not
foreclosed from negotiating relative to the contract of sale as distinguished
from the option."' 2 The court buttressed its conclusion with reference to
commentators who, while acknowledging that counter-offers in the form of
qualified or conditional acceptances traditionally constitute rejections, posit
that such responses do not terminate option contracts because of the unique
character of these agreements. 13
Humble, however, contends that even if such letter of May 2, 1963, be construed
as a conditional acceptance, it would not terminate the option agreement, and that it
could thereafter, during the term provided in the option agreement, make an uncon-
ditional acceptance which would be valid and effective. We are not in agreement
with Humble's contention. An option is a mere right of election, acquired by one
under a contract, to accept or reject a present offer within the time therein fixed.
Humble Oil, 419 S.W.2d at 451. Rather than providing the optionee with the disjunctive right
he acquired by contract, namely, to accept or reject the offer, the Texas Supreme Court gives
the optionee a conjunctive right, the right to accept and reject. This broad prerogative is more
than the optionor bargained for and corrupts the true nature of the option.
111. 428 S.W.2d at 95.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 94-95. The following commentary illustrates the distinction typically drawn
between ordinary offers and irrevocable offers in this context:
It is clearly established.., that a qualified or conditional acceptance of an offer does
not raise a contract because the minds of the parties do not meet in agreement upon
the same terms. It is said that such an acceptance is a counter-proposal for a new
contract, to give legal life to which requires the assent or acceptance of the other
party. It is in this sense that a qualified or conditional acceptance is a rejection of the
offer first made.
F. JAMES, supra note 57, § 838 (footnotes omitted). See also Humble Oil, 428 S.W.2d at 94.
However, in an option contract:
The minds of the parties have met in agreement, the distinctive feature of which is
that the optionor, for a consideration,'binds himself to keep the option open for elec-
tion by the optionee, for and during the time stipulated, or implied by law .... [T]he
rule peculiar to offers to the effect that a conditional acceptance is, in itself, in every
case, a rejection of the offer, is not applicable to an option contract, supported by a
consideration and fixing a time limit for election.
F. JAMES, supra note 57, § 838. Again, Professor James and the Humble Oil court declare
that, though a counter-offer typically equals a rejection, it does not operate as a rejection in the
context of an option contract. The court may have conceivably reached a different conclusion
if the optionee had actually tendered an outright rejection prior to the eventual acceptance.
However, the overall language of the opinion provides little more than a vague implication that
the distinction between an outright rejection and a counter-offer/rejection might be legally
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Applying this rationale, the court found that the seller's offer remained
open until the expiration of the option period, despite the intervening
counter-offer. Accordingly, the court granted the buyer's motion for sum-
mary judgment and ordered specific enforcement of the contract."
14
The overwhelming majority of courts treating this issue echo the conclu-
sions and reasoning articulated in Humble Oil.' 5 In particular, they refuse
to yield on the distinction between a regular offer and one rendered irrevoca-
ble by consideration. In the latter, the majority of courts either explicitly or
implicitly advance the notion that the offeree has paid for a set period of
ruminating time and nothing may intrude upon that prerogative - even a
clear counter-offer. 
1 16
The only question that these decisions arguably leave open is whether a
distinction should be, or has been, drawn between the counter-offer/rejec-
tion and an outright rejection in the context of an irrevocable offer. While
most of the foregoing opinions did not specifically address this issue, the
earlier assumption seems safe: given the prefatory acknowledgments of the
equivalence of counter-offers and rejections in these cases, no meaningful
differentiation exists under the majority view.' 17 Thus, although most of
these decisions address counter-offer/rejections rather than outright rejec-
tions, they convey the message that pure rejections command no greater def-
significant in an option contract. Humble Oil, 428 S.W.2d at 94; A. CORBIN, supra note 7,
§91.
Yet, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Cerbo v. Carabello, 376 Pa. 571, 574-75, 103 A.2d
908, 909 (1954), opined that outright rejection may compel a different result than a counter-
offer:
[T]he difficulty with defendants' position is that neither the words nor conduct estab-
lish an intention to rescind or abandon the rights under the option.... At most it
was a non-acceptance of an offer to enter into a new contract on the same terms
except for a reduction in price.... Nowhere does it appear that the lessee waived his
rights under the option to purchase.
Id. at 574-75, 103 A.2d at 909. See also Humble Oil, 428 S.W.2d at 94. While this language
does not quite reach the conclusion that a pure rejection should terminate an optionee's pre-
rogative to accept, it plants a seed of doubt regarding the breadth of the majority approach.
See also Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Marquette Bank & Trust Co., 295 N.W.2d 89, 92 n.4
(Minn. 1980) (Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that earlier precedent had, in fact, limited
the scope of the majority approach to counter-offers, as opposed to rejections). However, the
overall tenor of the controlling precedents seems to reflect the majority's view that neither a
counter-offer nor a rejection should terminate the offeree/optionee's power of acceptance. See,
e.g., Ryder v. Wescoat, 535 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); see also supra note 102.
114. Humble Oil, 428 S.W.2d at 94.
115. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
116. Id. As discussed below, any reliance upon the consideration paid to conclude that the
optionee has the entire period of time to vacillate is misplaced. See infra notes 185-99 and
accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 110-13 an accompanying text.
1990]
Catholic University Law Review
erence than counter-offers with respect to the termination of irrevocable
offers.' 18 That is, neither one will preempt a subsequent acceptance within
the option period.
Moreover, those commentators treating this question have taken no pains
to segregate the two concepts, at least concerning true counter-offers. " 9 As
Professor Simpson indicates:
Where an offer is supported by a binding contract that the of-
feree's power of acceptance shall continue for a stated time, will a
communicated rejection terminate the offeree's power to accept
within the time? On principle, there is no reason why it should....
So an option holder may complete a contract by communicating
his acceptance despite the fact that he has previously rejected the
offer. 1
20
The precise wording of the Second Restatement, "the power of acceptance
under an option contract is not terminated by rejection or counter-offer,'
121
further reinforces the proposition that no meaningful distinction is thought
to exist.
D. Ryder v. Wescoat
If any doubt lingers that most courts treating this issue readily equate
counter-offers with outright rejections and, yet, are not dissuaded from con-
cluding that neither will terminate the irrevocable offer, consider finally the
case of Ryder v. Wescoat. 122 In Ryder, the buyer secured an option to
purchase a 120 acre farm. The optionor/seller actually possessed an option
to purchase that tract of land and had transferred it to buyer.' 23 The parties
clearly defined the deadline for exercising the option and exchanged "valua-
ble" consideration. Ten days before the scheduled lapse of the option, the
buyer indicated to the seller that he would "pass" on the farm. Seller con-
strued this comment to mean that buyer was rejecting the offer and that
seller could now freely purchase the farm himself, or possibly extend the
option to another potential optionee.' 24 Consequently, when the buyer
118. Id.
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 37 (1979); L. SIMPSON, supra note
20, §§ 23, 24; A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 94.
120. See L. SIMPSON, supra note 20, § 23.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 37 (1979); Trautwein v. Leavey, 472 P.2d
776, 780 (Wyo. 1970) (court effectively equated counter-offer and rejection).
122. 535 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 270.
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presented an unqualified acceptance to the seller within the option period,
the seller refused to execute the agreement.'
25
The Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that the offer remained vital
even in the face of the apparent intervening rejection. Reasoning that the
option froze the offer to purchase for the scheduled period, the court deemed
the buyer's fleeting decision to "pass" on the offer inconsequential.' 26 The
court found the seller's arguments that the premature rejection terminated
the offer unimpressive:
Since an option stands on a different footing from an offer which
is made without consideration being paid therefor, and since it has
been held that an option is irrevocable for the time stated, and that
a counter-offer does not effect a rejection, it necessarily follows that
a rejection standing alone would not end the rights of the option
holder.
127
As part of its opinion, the court noted that "[n]o case has been cited, and
diligent research ... has failed to locate any case involving this precise is-
sue."' 28 This statement reinforces the notion that judicial authority espous-
ing the majority view prior to this case did not directly address whether an
outright rejection would terminate an irrevocable offer. 129 However, the
general discussions contained in those opinions acknowledging the loose in-
terchangeability of true counter-offers and rejections presaged the ultimate
application of the majority position to outright rejections. The court's rea-
soning in support of its refusal to "honor" the clear rejection appears to be
an ineluctable extension of earlier decisional authority rather than a quan-
tum leap forward into uncharted waters.' 3 '
Still, the court qualified its opinion by clearing a path of retreat for an
optionor who relies upon a subsequently recanted rejection (or counter-offer)
by an optionee. Echoing the sentiments of Professors Simpson and Corbin,
the court stated that a rejection of an irrevocable offer may terminate an
125. Id.
126. Id. at 271.
127. Id.
128. Id. But see supra notes 102, 110-13 and accompanying text.
129. 535 S.W.2d at 271. But see Bartholf v. Hautala, 194 N.Y.S.2d 660, 663 (1939) ("[A]n
acceptance incorporating a term, condition or reservation not embraced within the terms of
the offer is equivalent to a rejection; and the offer contained in the option may not be revived
by a subsequent unconditional acceptance."). In Stanley v. Gannon, the court stated: "An
acceptance incorporating a term, condition, or reservation not embraced within the terms of
the offer is equivalent to a rejection .... [T]he last paragraph of the letter of September 8,
1919, destroys its efficacy as an acceptance of the proposal contained in the option of March 7,
1919, and.., no contract, therefore, ever resulted." 109 Misc. 611, 613, 180 N.Y.S. 602, 606
(1919).
130. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
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offer if the optionor materially alters his position in reliance upon the rejec-
tion prior to a timely acceptance.1 3 1 The court believed that this "conces-
sion" would accomplish a twofold purpose: It rewards the optionee for
consideration paid by recognizing the full time period to consider the offer,
and it insulates the optionor from any loss incurred by changes of position in
reliance upon a premature rejection.
In a sense, the court adopted a typical, reliance-based "no harm, no foul"
approach. Undeniably, this tack protects the optionor who sells property to
another based on receipt of the optionee's rejection; but it does nothing for
the optionor who simply wants peace of mind from knowing that his prop-
erty is no longer for sale.132 It also fails to reach the optionor who immateri-
ally changes position in reliance upon the unnecessary and precipitous
rejection.
More critically, while the reliance-based approach may provide occasional
solace to the optionor, it dramatically manifests the counter-intuitive nature
of the majority position. If the optionee truly has paid for the entire period,
then a premature rejection can never provoke justifiable reliance by the op-
tionor. 133 A consistent application of the majority's premise would dictate
that the optionee could reject and accept with impunity - and without fear
that his ultimate acceptance could be compromised by estoppel. However,
131. Ryder, 535 S.W.2d at 271. See also Holt v. Sofflet, 338 Mich. 115, 61 N.W.2d 28
(1953); L. SIMPSON, supra note 20, § 23; A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 94.
132. As the court held in Theobald v. Chumley, 408 N.E.2d 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), an
optionor has an expectancy interest as soon as an optionee accepts without the need to show
reliance. Id. at 605. In essence, the optionor receives peace of mind from the knowledge that
his property has been purchased, and he need not pursue other potential purchasers. Con-
versely, after a rejection or counter-offer, an expectancy interest arises from the knowledge that
one will not be bound to a particular individual for a specific period. In a sense, the rejection is
defacto a promise not to accept the underlying offer, and the promisee is entitled to the legiti-
mate expectations - not merely the forseeable effects of reliant conduct - that such a promise
engenders. Of course, this point only begets the thorny question of whether this "promise"
requires new consideration. See infra notes 280-311 and accompanying text. See also Farber
& Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 903 (1985) (suggesting a "new theory of distinctly contractual obligation" that
enforces virtually every promise made pursuant to some economic activity). Id. at 905.
133. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979); Boyer, Promis-
sory Estoppel: Principle From Precedents, 60 MICH. L. REV. 639 (1952); Feinman, Promissory
Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678 (1984); Metzger & Phillips, The Emer-
gence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472
(1983). Generally, an estoppel will not arise if the requisite reliance is not justifiable and
within the contemplation of the promisor. See, e.g., Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102
Idaho 63, 625 P.2d 417 (1981), Fandess v. Borden, Inc. 667 F. 2d 628 (7th Cir. 1981). If the
optionee truly has bought the entire period, how could he ever be held accountable (and then
estopped) for his premature rejection. The very possibility of an optionor's reasonable reliance
upon such rejection proves that the option period is not the impenetrable enclave that it is
cracked up to be.
[Vol. 39:491
The Option Contract
by the Ryder court's own tacit admission, that result is profoundly undesir-
able and manifestly unfair to the optionor. Plainly, the majority has injected
an estoppel component to ease the "pain" of the optionor. However, in pre-
scribing this palliative, the majority exposes the frailties of its own diagnosis.
In essence, by acknowledging the optionor's possible justifiable reliance upon
a premature rejection, the court implicitly concedes that the optionee has not
actually purchased the entire option period.
In sum, the foregoing case law reflects the majority jurisdictions' indul-
gence of an acceptance that succeeds an outright rejection in the context of
an option contract. While the troublesome reliance component of the Ryder
analysis assuages much of the harm that may spring from such indulgence,
the majority approach constitutes an inexplicable subversion of traditional
contract theory. Moreover, the apparent unwillingness to concede that at
least an outright rejection should terminate the power of acceptance further
impeaches the credibility of the majority position.
The results reached by those scarce decisions espousing the minority view
are more intellectually satisfying and more attentive to the basic rudiments
of contract law. Nonetheless, while this Article agrees with the conclusions
reached in those minority jurisdictions, it by no means is satisfied that a fully
explicated rationale has been articulated. Therefore, after brief discussion of
the representative precedent that finds an option contract terminated by
counter-offer/rejection, the Article will explain why the majority's posture is
flawed, why the minority's view is favorable, and why the Second Restate-
ment should be modified to reflect the more logical approach.
IV. COUNTER-OFFER/REJECTION TERMINATES THE
IRREVOCABLE OFFER
A. The Landberg Rationale
In Landberg v. Landberg, 134 the California Court of Appeals unequivo-
cally stated that an offeree's rejection terminated an offer made irrevocable
and secured by consideration, and thereby rendered nugatory any subse-
quent acceptance.' 35 In Landberg, the court confronted a divorce decree
embracing a settlement agreement that prescribed a set procedure in the
event that one spouse elected to sell or buy stock from the other.'3 6 Under
134. 24 Cal. App. 3d 742, 101 Cal. Rptr. 335 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
135. Id. at 757-58, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46.
136. Id. at 747, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 338. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, if
either spouse chose to sell to, or purchase stock from, the other, the following procedure would
apply:
At any time either spouse may give to the other spouse ... written notice that on or
after the fifteenth subsequent calendar day, but prior to the twentieth subsequent
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the terms of the agreement, when one spouse offered to buy or sell a block of
shares thus creating an option, the other spouse would have thirty days to
provide written notification of acceptance.' 3 7 This option ripened into a
controversy as a result of one spouse's offer to sell stock and the other
spouse's communication of two separate and conflicting responses. 138
The offeror (husband) made an offer "to purchase or sell" the remaining
interest in jointly held stocks with the offeree (wife).' 3 9 This offer contained
several conditions. Twenty-five days later, the wife provided the husband
with an acceptance qualified by several of her own conditions. In no way did
the acceptance mirror the terms of the original offer."o When the husband
replied that the wife's response did not constitute a valid acceptance due to
its failure to adopt all the conditions of the offer, the wife responded with a
telegram that purported to accept the offer as presented.' 4 ' The wife sent
the telegram in a timely fashion and offered no qualifications other than a
reference to the fact that the "election [to buy or sell] is in conformity with
and subject to the governing provisions of the April 10, 1967 [Settlement]
Agreement."'142 At this point, however, the husband advised the wife that
the qualified acceptance was invalid and that the subsequent unconditional
acceptance was ineffectual.'
43
Affirming the lower court's denial of the wife's request for an order declar-
ing valid her acceptance of the offer to "buy or sell," the California Court of
Appeals held that the initial conditional acceptance was tantamount to a
rejection and terminated the offer.' 44 In its multi-tiered analysis, the court
began with the broad proposition that an effective acceptance must be "abso-
calendar day, the party giving notice will state a price per share of the shares of each
corporation, at which such shares shall be bought or sold. . . . Within thirty (30)
days after the price per share is thus stated, the other spouse shall give written notice
of his or her election to buy the first spouse's shares, or to sell his or her shares to the
first spouse, at the price per share stated in the notice under part (c) hereof.... If the
'other spouse' shall have failed to make an election as hereinabove provided, the first
spouse may elect to buy the 'other spouse's' shares, or to sell his or her shares to the
other spouse, at the price per share stated under part 'c' hereof.
Id. at 747-48, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 338 (quoting paragraph 10 of the agreement).
137. Id. at 751, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 341. The facts herein are not appreciably unlike the
"double option" contract observed by Professor Corbin. See supra note 67. See also
Valashinas v. Koniuto, 308 N.Y. 333, 124 N.E.2d 300 (1968).
138. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 748-49, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 338-40.
139. Id. at 748, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
140. Id. at 748-49, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
141. Id. at 749, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 339-40.
142. Id., 101 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
143. Id. at 749-50, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
144. Id. at 752, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
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lute and unqualified." '4 5 In the court's words, anything less than this une-
quivocal acceptance would constitute "a rejection terminating the offer; it is
a new proposal or counter-offer which must be accepted by the former of-
feror now turned offeree before a binding contract results."' 4 6 The court
then defined an option contract, drew pertinent distinctions between revoca-
ble and irrevocable offers, and acknowledged that the husband's "proposal"
indeed constituted an irrevocable offer.147 Further, bridging any perceived
gap between revocable and irrevocable offers, the court declared that the
offeree must accept the offer embraced by the option contract "in the terms
in which it is made."'
148
Accordingly, the court reasoned that "if the acceptance contains condi-
tions not embraced in the offer or adds new terms thereto ... the purported
acceptance may be ignored by the optionor."' 4 9 While these pronounce-
ments were unremarkable, they set the stage for the point at which the
Landberg court and the majority of jurisdictions treating this issue would
begin to part ways: "If the optionee changes the terms of the offer embodied
in the option agreement 'the alteration of such terms, or the addition of any
change or limitation, is tantamount to a rejection of the original offer and the
making of a counter offer.' "'
Having thus characterized the offer and acceptance framework in the op-
tion contract context, the court concluded that the wife's unconditional ac-
ceptance constituted a "nullity" because the preceding qualified acceptance
actually rejected the original offer and "put an end to it."'' In an ironic yet
145. Id. at 750, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
146. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 750, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
147. Id. at 750-51, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
148. Id.. at 752, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
149. Id., 101 Cal. Rptr. at 342. See also Williams v. Espey, 11 Utah 2d 317, 358 P.2d 903
(1961) (holding that an acceptance which adds qualifications or conditions is a counter-offer);
Alexander v. Bosworth, 26 Cal. App. 589, 147 P. 607 (1915) (same). But see J.R. Stone Co. v.
Keate, 576 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Utah 1978) (court qualified the mirror image rule's application to
option contracts such that a counter-offer existed only where a "substantial variance" between
the terms of an option and an offer to exercise it existed).
150. Landberg, 24 Cal. App. 3d at 752, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 342 (quoting Alexander, 26 Cal.
App. at 597, 147 P. at 611).
151. Id. at 757; 101 Cal. Rptr. at 345. " 'The rejection of an offer kills the offer.' . .
[W]hen an offer under an option contract has been rejected, the party rejecting cannot subse-
quently, at his option, accept the rejected offer and thus convert the same to an agreement by
acceptance." (quoting Stanley v. Robert S. Odell & Co., 97 Cal. App. 2d 521, 534, 218 P.2d
162, 171 (Ct. App. 1950)). See also Goodwin v. Hidalgo County Water Control & Improve-
ment Dist. No. 1, 58 S.W.2d 1092 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (holding that a rejected offer cannot
be subsequently accepted). See also Bartholf v. Hautala, 194 N.Y.S.2d 660, 663 (1939).
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not unprecedented twist of phrase, the court declared that "the rejection in
the instant case was irrevocable."'
152
B. Jones v. Moncrief-Cook Co.
While Landberg is a rarity, it is not a derelict in mainstream contract
jurisprudence considering this issue. Other California cases, as well as a few
cases in other jurisdictions, comprise the minority view. The Landberg deci-
sion, however, is significant because it rekindled the flames of case law dat-
ing back to the turn of the century. In 1908, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
authored one of earliest state court opinions on the issue in Jones v. Mon-
crief-Cook Co. "' The court held that an optionee's counter-offer/rejection
terminated the power of acceptance and freed the optionor from further
susceptibility. 154
In Jones, a one-year lease permitted the lessee to exercise an option to
purchase the leased land during the period of the lease at a price equal to an
offer received from a prospective buyer.'55 After being informed of an offer
by a third party to purchase the land in question, the lessee sent a letter to
the lessor which, at best, was a grumbling acceptance and, at worst, a
counter-offer/rejection.' 56 Within a week, and before termination of the
152. Landberg, 24 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 345. See also Stanley v. Robert S.
Odell & Co., 97 Cal. App. 2d 521, 218 P.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1950) (holding that once an offer
has been rejected, it cannot be accepted); CLARK ON CONTRACTS § 21 (2d ed. 1904) (noting
that a rejection prevents the offer from remaining open to acceptance); Niles v. Hancock, 140
Cal. 157, 73 P. 840 (1903) (holding that a counter-offer was a rejection of the original offer and
subsequent acceptance by purchaser could not create a contract).
153. 25 Okla. 856, 108 P. 403 (1908).
154. Id. at 865, 108 P. at 407.
155. Id. at 858-59, 108 P. at 404. Again, the option agreement essentially resembled a
version of the right of first refusal seen in many contemporary real estate transactions: "the
party of the first part hereby guarantees to the second parties the privilege of purchasing the
above lot at any time before the terminatiou of this lease .. " Id. at 858, 108 P. at 404. Of
course, the true option contract and the right of first refusal are different concepts, with the
primary distinction being that the right of first refusal only gives the holder the prerogative to
purchase on the same terms offered by third parties. See Litvinoff, supra note 57, at 745-47.
As a practical matter, the right of first refusal ripens into an option contract at the time the
optionor receives a bona fide offer to purchase or sell from a third party. The individual who
has secured the option then has the opportunity to match the competing offer. Park-Lake Car
Wash, Inc. v. Springer, 352 N.W.2d 409 (Minn. 1984). See further Green v. First Am. Bank &
Trust, 511 So. 2d 569, 573-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that right of first refusal
ripens into an option when third party's offer is received). But see A. CORBIN, supra note 7,
§ 261.
156. Jones, 25 Okla. at 859-60, 108 P. at 404-05. In pertinent part, the letter announced:
"We are rather surprised at such a price that is offered for such property here, but of course we
may be able to make some arrangements with you for the purchase of the lot .... If you could
make us a good proposition, we might be able to handle the deal for you." Id.
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lease, the lessee attempted to accept the original offer on its precise terms. 15 7
The lessor refused to close the transaction, contending, inter alia, that the
first letter from the lessee constituted a refusal to purchase and absolved the
lessor from further responsibility. 5 '
The court recognized that the initial correspondence fell far short of an
acceptance and noted that there was no evidence of the lessee's desire to
consider the original offer for an extended period of time. Rather, the court
found that the lessee wrote "a letter which is tantamount to a rejection, to
ask for an offer, the terms of which are not cash, but suggested payments at
different times . . . ."'59 Construing the counteroffer as a rejection of the
option terms and as an "effort to make a new contract, '' 6° the court con-
cluded that: "[tihe rejection of the offer was irrevocable. We think that
amounted to a rejection and waiver of any privilege to purchase the lot prior
to the termination of the lease at the price offered by the proposed
purchaser."
161
C. A Sampling of Federal Court Cases: Title Insurance & Guaranty Co.
v. Hart and James v. Darby
Finally, in one of the rare federal court cases to reach this issue, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a qualified
acceptance or a counter-offer constituted a clear rejection of an original of-
fer, 162 and intimated that such action by an offeree could void his power of
acceptance even in the context of an option contract. 63 However, the court
actually skirted the subsequent acceptance issue by concluding that the of-
feree's failure to accept the original offer resulted from a mistaken belief that
he could tender certain royalties rather than cash as part of the exercise of
the option.'"6 The court of appeals found that the offeree's deficient re-
sponse was reasonable, and, while not constituting a bona fide acceptance, at
157. Id. at 860, 108 P. at 405 ("We will pay you thirty-one hundred dollars [the initial
price] for lot thirty block forty, Lawton.").
158. Id.
159. Id. at 865, 108 P. at 407.
160. Id.
161. Id. (footnote omitted). See also CLARK, supra note 152, § 24. It is noteworthy that
the court characterized this rejection as a waiver of the privilege to purchase the subject real
estate. This Article dicusses the employment of the term waiver and its pertinence to the
rejection of an option contract infra notes 280-310 and accompanying text. See also RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 47 (1932).
162. Title Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Hart, 160 F.2d 961, 966 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947).
163. Id. at 966.
164. Id. at 963.
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the very least, left the offer intact and susceptible to a subsequent valid
acceptance. 165
Ironically, commentators have cited this case as support for both the ma-
jority and minority positions. 166 Professor Corbin referred to this case as
authority for the proposition that a "counteroffer by such an offeree... does
not terminate the power of acceptance."'' 67 By contrast, Professor Axelrod
listed this decision as one of the few cases embracing the minority view that
a counter-offer terminates an offer in an option contract. 168 While Professor
Axelrod relied substantially upon dicta, his interpretation appears much
more plausible than Professor Corbin's.
Almost a half-century earlier, another federal court had articulated a pref-
erence for what would become the minority view. In James v. Darby, 169 the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a qualified acceptance was
"under the authorities, and in fact, a rejection (of the option)."'"7 In James,
the optionor had provided optionee with a thirty-day option to purchase real
property, commencing on November 2, 1896. On November 25, the op-
tionee wrote to optionor and stated that "[i]f details are satisfactorily ar-
ranged, I have decided to accept your offer." In addition, he sought an
abstract to ensure that title was perfect.' 7
On November 27, 1896, optionor wrote to optionee, assuring him that
"there will be no trouble about the title" and that he would procure an ab-
stract. Optionor also referenced a commission which 0ptionee would owe to
a separate individual as a result of the sale.172 However, on December 24,
1896, optionee received a telegram from optionor stating that he had sold
the property to a third party.
The court examined the language in the optionee's November 25 corre-
spondence and found that the letter contained "new conditions imposed,
changes suggested" rendering the acceptance conditional.' 73 Noting that, as
of November 25, only one week remained on the option and that optionee
165. Id. at 963, 966-67. Preserving the offer without finding a binding acceptance is an
appropriate approach where the optionee's response does not reflect a rejection or its func-
tional equivalent. See infra note 318.
166. See infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
167. See A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 91 & n.29., at 385. See also J. MURRAY, supra note
12, § 43B n.26.
168. See Axelrod, supra note 8, at 419.
169. 100 F. 224 (8th Cir. 1900).
170. Id. at 228.
171. Id. at 225.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 228.
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could not reasonably expect optionor to receive the letter and fulfill the con-
ditions, the court held:
The letter of November 25, 1896, was not, therefore, an acceptance
of the option.... It imposed conditions which could not be com-
plied with within the time limited by the terms of the option, and
both parties, in the very nature of things, must be held to have
known it. The option of November 2, 1896, and the letter of No-
vember 25, 1896, therefore, created no contract, for the reason that
the minds of the parties did not meet, but, on the contrary, the
terms offered were distinctly rejected by the requirement of other
and additional terms. So strict are the authorities, that after [op-
tionor] received this letter . . ., [optionee] would not have been
allowed, if he had so desired, to have recalled it, and then accepted
in unconditional terms the option of November 2, 1896. The re-
ceipt by [optionor] of that letter rendered the option nugatory be-
tween the parties. '
74
Accordingly, the court concluded that the letter was a rejection of the option
and "ended all relations subsisting between [optionors] and [optionee] as to
the option."' 
75
Essentially, the minority's rationale is predicated on an unwillingness to
depart from traditional contract principles which focus on the action of the
174. Id. at 228-29.
175. Id. Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit cited Supreme Court authority in support of its
conclusion that the rejection terminated the option. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Columbus
Rolling Mill, 119 U.S. 149 (1886). There, the defendant/offeror offered to sell plaintiff/offeree
between 2000 and 5000 tons of 50 pound rails for $54 per gross ton. Under the terms of the
offer, the offeree was obligated to purchase at least 2000 tons, and to notify the offeror of his
acceptance by December 20, 1879. The offeree tendered his acceptance on December 16; how-
ever, he only placed an order for 1200 tons. He subsequently accepted without qualification
the terms of the offer within the designated time frame. The Supreme Court held:
A proposal to accept, or an acceptance, upon terms varying from those offered, is a
rejection of the offer, and puts an end to the negotiation, unless the party who made
the original offer renews it, or assents to the modification suggested. The other party,
having once rejected the offer, cannot afterwards revive it by tendering an acceptance
of it.
Id. at 151. While the Eighth Circuit cites this case in support of its finding that a rejection
terminates an optionee's power of acceptance (and the author would welcome such weighty
support for his position), a close reading of Justice Gray's opinion indicates that he was not
addressing a classic option situation or an irrevocable offer. Id.
Yet, at least one other Supreme Court decision can be interpreted to stand for the proposi-
tion that a counter-offer/rejection terminates an option contract. In Beaumont v. Prieto, 249
U.S. 554 (1919), the offeror provided the offeree with a three-month option to purchase prop-
erty in Manila. In an apparent attempt to accept the offer, the optionee, by letter dated Janu-
ary 17, 1912, stated, "I offer to purchase said property for the sum of three hundred and seven
thousand (307,000.00) pesos, Ph. C., cash, net to you, payable the first day of May, 1912, or
before and with delivery of a torrens title free of all encumbrances as taxes and other debts."
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offeree in determining whether an offer in an option contract is terminated.
While courts have not employed the precise rationale advanced in this Arti-
cle, judicial decisions suggest an unspoken acceptance of the notion that the
irrevocability of an offer is directly related to the conduct of the offeror - he
cannot revoke the offer during the option period. The pledge of irrevocabil-
ity does not, barring special covenants, address or purport to address the
conduct of the offeree. Again, the recurring motif is self-evident: the option
contract is an irrevocable not irrejectable offer. The following discussion
springs from this premise and attempts to add flesh to the skeletal outline of
the minority position.
V. APOLOGY FOR THE MINORITY VIEW: WHY A REJECTION OR PURE
COUNTER-OFFER SHOULD OPERATE TO TERMINATE AN
OPTION
Several persuasive auguments illustrate why the minority view represents
the preferable approach. These positions draw upon technical and indispu-
table principles of contract formation, applications of tenets in analogous
contexts, and considerations of public policy and reasonable commercial ex-
pectations. Of course, this treatment will necessarily deal in generalizations
and broad prescriptions. In individual cases, parties may demonstrate an
intent unique to their situation and divergent from the typical option con-
tract. When that occurs, the commonly held rules and the assumed desires
Id. at 555. The option, however, had simply provided the opportunity to buy "for the price of
its assessed government valuation." Id.
Justice Holmes stated that "the letter of January 17 plainly departed from the terms of the
offer as to the time of payment and was, as it expressed to be, a counter offer." Id. at 556. He
therefore reasoned:
We do not find it necessary to go into the discussion of the later communications
[which purported to accept] .... The right to hold the defendant to the proposed
terms by a word of assent was gone, and after that all the plaintiff could do was to
make anoffer in his turn.
Id.
Subsequent cases have attempted to distinguish Beaumont on the grounds that the option
therein was not supported by consideration. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Westside Inv.
Corp., 428 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Tex. 1968). While the Supreme Court's opinion does not precisely
address the nature of the option or its "validation," it is unlikely that Justice Holmes would
characterize a simple revocable offer (or a purportedly irrevocable offer that lacks considera-
tion) as an option. Admittedly, there is an insufficient basis upon which to argue that the
position advanced in the Second Restatement is at war with Supreme Court authority. Hence,
its reference has been relegated to this footnote. There is, however, at least a hint that the
Beaumont court would have treated the "majority" view inhospitably. See Humble Oil & Ref.




of the parties will cede to their contrary intentions as manifested in each
case.
A. An Irrevocable Offer Is Not by its Nature Irrejectable
When an offeree pays valuable consideration to secure an option, he is
concerned primarily with preventing the offeror from playing ball with a
third party while the offeree mulls over the proposal. An offeree is not real-
istically planning to reject and subsequently accept the proposal within the
"guaranteed period." The typical option contract envisions a scenario in
which the optionee rests assured that the property or service will not be sold
out from under him. However, an offeror's gratuitous representation that he
will hold an offer open for a set period of time does not ipso facto preclude
him from revoking the offer prior to the offeree's acceptance.' 76 The law
will not bind the offeror to his promise to hold the offer open unless the
offeree pays valuable consideration to the offeror to secure the pledge of
irrevocability.
As stated above, the Second Restatement declares that conventional rules
governing termination of an offer by counter-offer/rejection, revocation, or
death or incapacity of the offeror or offeree do not apply to option con-
tracts.177 Yet, no one has articulated a rationale for applying this exception
in such an indiscriminate fashion. The justification for giving the irrevocable
offer immunity from termination during the option period most likely stems
from a basic misconception that the consideration paid guarantees flexibility
of choice until the expiration of the agreed time period.1
78
A much more plausible interpretation of the typical option transaction is
that the offeree has paid for the privilege of contemplating an offer that exists
for him alone, at least for a set timeframe or a reasonable period. 1 7  If he
chooses to exercise his franchise by rejecting the offer, then the process
should end and the offeror should be free to seek another contractor (or no
other bidder) without fear of reprisal. To protect only the optionor who has
detrimentally relied upon a premature rejection, while not reinforcing an
176. See A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 262. But see U.C.C. § 2-205 (1977) (written contract
for sale of goods which states that it will be held open for a specified period cannot be revoked
during that period); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1979) (offer that is ex-
pected to induce reliance, and does so, is binding as option contract "to the extent necessary to
avoid injustice").
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 37 (1979). See also supra note 27.
178. See A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 273; L. SIMPSON, supra note 20, § 23; see also supra
note 100.
179. See, e.g., Ellis v. Waldrop, 627 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. App. 1982).
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optionor's legitimate expectations drawn from such a rejection, falls short of
the mark. 18
0
By securing the option, the offeree is cognizant of his ability to dictate the
timing of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. This factor alone provides
a valuable trade-off for the consideration exchanged. The optionee may now
freely vacillate, negotiate, ponder, and seek other deals while the option re-
mains open. l18 If the optionee has any doubts regarding the ultimate deci-
sion, then he should simply do nothing. There is no reason for him to
announce an early decision knowing that he might recant at a later time
within the option period. In the ordinary situation, nothing in the underly-
ing transaction suggests that the optionee has purchased a prerogative to yo-
yo the offeror back and forth until the option's expiration date.
The very fact that an optionee has an insulated period to consider an offer
makes it wholly unnecessary that he should also have an opportunity to
present conflicting responses during such option period. Further, there is no
legitimate reason in law or logic to tolerate a premature rejection and to
permit it to imperil the optionor's freedom of choice or peace of mind.
Although the protection afforded the optionor who detrimentally relies on
the imprudent early rejection provides some relief,'82 that relief is incom-
plete. As stated earlier, this "no harm, no foul" approach does nothing for
the offeror who rightfully deserves the psychic comfort of knowing that a
rejection has released him from any commitment.
It is certainly understandable that an optionee may wish to deliberate dur-
ing the pendency of the option and may even wish to pursue other possibili-
ties. Yet, he can accomplish that goal by a response manifesting a desire to
180. Plainly, the optionor should be allowed to treat a rejection as a termination of the offer
and derive whatever legitimate expectation such assurance creates. To suggest that the con-
cept of expectation has no place in this scenario would further nail the lid closed on the coffin
holding the vestiges of bargain theory. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT 46-53
(1974); see also Feinman, supra note 133.
181. In certain circumstances, the ability to seek a better deal may be circumscribed, par-
ticularly in the case of constructive option contracts. For example, in Drennan v. Star Paving,
51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958), the court cautioned that the optionee would forfeit his
constructive option if he began to dicker about the price in an effort to secure a better deal. Id.
at 415; 333 P.2d at 760; see also supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. This caveat
strengthens the argument that an option contract protects the offeree from revocation, but
does not insulate him from the effects of a rejection. In Drennan, the general contractor's
reliance upon the subcontractor's bid constituted the rough equivalent of consideration in the
classic option contract. 51 Cal. 2d at 414; 333 P.2d at 760. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1979). Yet, the court made clear that such reliance did not create an
equitable option structure that would tolerate indiscriminate dickering. Drennan, 51 Cal. 2d
at 415; 333 P.2d at 760. Likewise, courts should not permit the payment of consideration for
an option to fabricate something far more enveloping than a simple irrevocable offer.
182. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
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consider the matter further or by saying nothing at all. An optionee can
simply avoid the finality of a rejection by indicating that the intermediate
response to the offer does not intend to supplant the offer or alter the pro-
posed bargain. If an optionee fails to preserve the vitality of an offer, then he
should logically be barred from presenting a subsequent unconditional
acceptance.
Again, the reams of scholarship devoted to option contracts address vari-
ous aspects of the irrevocability question and, in some instances, valiantly
draw subtle distinctions between an option contract and an irrevocable of-
fer. 183 But, precious few discuss the irrejectability of an irrevocable offer or
its brethren option contract. Certainly, no one satisfactorily explains why
such offers should survive the offeree's counter-offer or outright rejection."84
In sum, the termination of the power of acceptance by a pure rejection or
counter-offer/rejection represents one of the cornerstones of contract forma-
tion and the offer/acceptance process. Thus, to preclude its applicability on
mere juristic ipse dixit or the unexplained opinion of the Restatement's re-
porters is wholly inappropriate, however erudite and well-schooled its
primogenitors may be. If compelling reasons were presented to justify an
exception to traditional formation tenets, then, by all means the general rules
should cede. Here, no evidence exists to warrant such an exception.
B. An Offeree Does Not Pay for an Entire Period of Vacillation
Some have argued that the payment of consideration provides an optionee
with a shield that neither revocation nor rejection can penetrate.'" 5 The ra-
tionale centers upon the fact that an optionee has bought the time and can
thereby reject an offer without endangering his prerogative to accept. How-
ever, this argument is completely untenable. The fact that an optionee can-
not accept an offer and then subsequently reject it during the option period
rebuts any notion that the entire option period is owned by the optionee.
It is axiomatic that an acceptance of an offer closes the circle of assent and
forms a contract.8 6 Moreover, there is no distinction drawn between the
acceptance of a commonplace revocable offer and an offer rendered irrevoca-
183. See, e.g., McGovney, supra note 63; Litvinoff, supra note 57, at 747-48.
184. See Axelrod, supra note 8, at 417-28. Professor Axelrod correctly reports the diver-
gence of legal opinion with regard to the rejection of an option contract, but he fails to offer
any comprehensive rationale for the cases supporting the majority position. The author sug-
gests that this failing should not be attributed to Professor Axelrod, but rather to the lack of
any meaningful explanation for the majority position offered in those cases espousing it. The
comments and illustrations supporting section 37 of the Second Restatement are likewise
wanting.
185. See supra notes 78-130 and accompanying text.
186. See generally supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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ble as part of an option contract. The acceptance of an offer embraced by an
option contract creates an agreement that cannot be unilaterally unmade or
rescinded by a subsequent rejection - even if it occurs within the option
period.187 For example, in Madison v. Marlatt, 188 the Supreme Court of
Wyoming declared that an option contract "becomes a bilateral contract,
binding upon both parties" when the optionee manifests an intent to accept
the offer within the designated timeframe. 8 9 The court added that the "es-
sential difference between an option and an offer to sell is the option's irrevo-
cable nature."' 90
Similarly, in Theobald v. Chumley, 9' the Indiana Court of Appeals rein-
forced the notion that acceptance of an irrevocable offer is final and irrevers-
ible. There, the court was directly confronted with a situation in which the
optionors sought specific performance of an option that the optionee alleg-
edly had exercised and then subsequently rejected. The optionee had se-
cured a ninety-day option to exchange his 20.96 acres of land for cash and
six acres of land owned by the optionor. The optionee informed optionor's
representatives that he intended to exercise his option. However, a survey of
the land prepared for the sale included two to three acres of land more than
the acreage included in the option. The optionee argued that, because the
parties never agreed upon the additional acreage, there was never a meeting
of the minds, and, consequently, the option was not effectively exercised.'
92
The court rejected the optionee's defense, finding that the
[o]ptionors had no reason to expect that the survey would contain
any lands other than those described in the option. We believe the
effect of the survey, by including additional acreage, was to merely
make an offer as to the amount over that agreed to in the option
agreement, which could be rejected or accepted by the optionors,
but which did not effect [sic] the validity of the acceptance of the
original option.' 93
Thus, because the optionee effectively exercised the option, he could not
then reject it. "Upon communication by [optionee] that the option would be
exercised, the optionors acquired an expectancy interest that the option, as
187. See, e.g., A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 264.
188. 619 P.2d 708 (Wyo. 1980). See also Ferguson v. Seggern, 434 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968).
189. Id. at 714.
190. Id.
191. 77 Ind. 668, 408 N.E.2d 603 (1980).




agreed to, would be exercised."1 94 According to the court, the contract be-
came enforceable at the time of such communication.
Other courts have echoed this sentiment in no uncertain terms: "So long
as [the option] remains unaccepted it is a unilateral writing lacking the mu-
tual elements of contract, but when accepted an executory contract arises
mutually binding upon the parties. [W]hen the option . . . is accepted it
ceases to be an option and becomes a mutually binding agreement." ' 9
Moreover, although the Second Restatement explicitly distinguishes irrev-
ocable and revocable offers in terms of the effectiveness of a rejection,196 it
draws no such distinction with regard to the impact of an acceptance. In
fact, the Second Restatement's subtext clearly implies that an acceptance of
any offer, irrevocable or otherwise, ends any debate and forms a binding
contract. The only mention of option contracts in this context is section 63's
instruction that "an acceptance under an option contract is not operative
until received by the offeror." '197 Neither the Restatement nor case law men-
tions any possibility that an optionee may accept an option, and then subse-
quently reject it within the option's prescribed timeframe. 98 Thus, there
appear to be no articulated exceptions to the general rule that once an op-
tionee has manifested an acceptance, neither the optionor nor the optionee
194. Id. This court did not require that an optionor demonstrate detrimental reliance to
estop the optionee from tendering an effective rejection. Rather, it intimated that the op-
tionor's expectancy interest arose at the moment of optionee's acceptance. The remainder of
the option period dissipated into thin air. It is eminently plausible to conclude that a rejection
should have the same finality. If an optionee "owns" an entire period to accept or reject a
specific offer, and he elects to reject, for example, on day two of a ninety-day option, it is only
reasonable for the optionor to believe that the optionee does not agree to the terms of the
option and that he will not change his mind. In fact, if a person exercises an option, it must be
presumed that the optionee believes it to be in his best interests or to his advantage. If an
optionee rejects or counter-offers, it must follow, therefore, that the optionee believes the op-
tion is not advantageous. Thus, an expectancy interest should accrue to the optionor who is
now able to offer the property to another or is free to enjoy the property without the possibility
of a sale.
195. Schlein v. Gairoard, 127 N.J.L. 358, 359-60, 22 A.2d 539, 540 (1941). See also Litvi-
noff, Of the Promise of Sale and Contract to Sell, 34 LA. L. REv. 1017, 1036-37, nn. 121-22,
124, 128 (1974).
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 37 (1979). See also supra notes 1, 27, 177
and accompanying text.
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1979). This provision represents an
exception to the mailbox rule, which states generally that a proper acceptance by mail becomes
effective upon dispatch, not receipt. See infra notes 258-68 and accompanying text,
198. Of course, any jurisdiction that does not embrace the mailbox rule would hold that an
acceptance mailed first but received last would not form a binding agreement. But that ap-
proach does no violence to the notion that an acceptance, whenever effective, cannot be "un-
made" by a subsequent rejection.
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can unilaterally rescind, barring non-performance or similar provocation for
the discharge of a contractual duty. 1
99
Taking the foregoing proposition as presented, any suggestion that the of-
feree has the entire option period for indiscriminate vacillation is fatuous. If
an offeree cannot accept and then reject within the option period, then the
raison d'etre for allowing an acceptance after a rejection within such period,
that the offeree has paid for the entire timeframe to debate this issue, is
stripped of any legitimacy. It amounts to nothing more than a post hoc ra-
tionalization to justify the conclusion that a rejection should not terminate
an irrevocable offer. Indeed, permitting an offeree to reject an irrevocable
offer and then accept the same offer during an option period, while also re-
fusing to allow an offeree to accept an irrevocable offer and then reject it
during the pendency of such option is unfathomable. Applying traditional
contract rules in the latter case, but dismissing them in the former, can again
199. The absence of specific language in the Restatement is not necessarily dispositive of
the question. However, given the explicit phraseology of section 37, one can only assume that,
if the possibility existed that an optionee could undo an acceptance by a subsequent rejection
within the option period, the Restatement would have enunciated that principle in sections
immediately following the definitions of acceptance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 50-62 (1979).
Moreover, those commentators who have examined the deposited acceptance rule in the
narrow confines of the irrevocable offer lend credence to the notion that there can be no effec-
tive acceptance/rejection scenario within the option period. For example, Professor Litvinoff
explains that determining when a rejection may overtake an acceptance turns on whether an
offeror made an offer revocable or irrevocable. Litvinoff, supra note 57, at 729-3 1. He declares
that if an offer is irrevocable, then conceivably a rejection may override an earlier mailed
acceptance. Id. at 729. Professor Litvinoff reaches this conclusion not by reasoning that an
offeree has unlimited latitude during the option period; rather, he correctly proffers that the
proverbial "mailbox" or "deposited acceptance" rule does not apply to option contracts. Id. at
730.
The key, however, is not so much the content of Professor Litvinoff's discussion, but its
existence. Clearly, if an optionee could recant his acceptance with impunity during the option
period, then this colloquy regarding the effective communication of the respective responses
and any reference to the applicability of the mailbox rule would be academic and unnecessary
- except in situations where the acceptance arrived after the option deadline and was thus
ineffective, independent of any subsequent rejection. Indeed, in addressing the related question
of whether an acceptance can overtake a rejection, Professor Litvinoff announces that when
the parties make an offer irrevocable, both acceptance and rejection are effective upon receipt
by the offeror. Id. at 73 1. Proceeding from this assumption, he concludes that "if an offeror
receives an acceptance, a rejection that arrives later, though transmitted before the acceptance,
does not prevent the formation of a contract." Id. Similar commentary suggests that the
applicability or non-applicability of the mailbox rule to option contract scenarios may be of
critical importance, thus negating the assumption that the entire period is available for the
fickle optionee's vacillation. See A. CORBIN, supra note 7, §§ 78-80. Although this reasoning
is somewhat tortuous, it further supports the argument that the communication of an effective
acceptance closes the circle of assent with irreversible finality whether the offer inviting such
acceptance is revocable or irrevocable.
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only be explained by a blatant misperception of an option contract's nature.
Option contracts encompass irrevocable offers, not "unacceptable" offers.
Logic compels the conclusion that these same irrevocable offers are not
"irrejectable."
Neither a binding acceptance nor a binding rejection would do violence to
the purpose underlying the offer contained in an option contract and the
consideration paid to secure its irrevocability. In both cases, the optionee,
not the optionor, squeezes the trigger. The optionee has gained the advan-
tage of his bargain - a precise time period within which the optionor cannot
revoke the offer. The optionee has, and knows that he has, that entire period
to mull the proposal. He hardly deserves sympathy if, within that period, he
accepts the offer and then seeks escape through a subsequent rejection. Con-
tract law in general will not allow the optionee to loosen the ties that bind
the circle of assent. For exactly the same reasons, an optionee who rejects an
offer has little room to complain if the law does not indulge a subsequent
acceptance - even if it is tendered within the option period.
C. Option Contracts Should Be Construed Strictly
in Favor of the Optionor
In close cases, an option contract will almost always be interpreted in
favor of an optionor and against an optionee. 2° Contract jurisprudence is
replete with examples of judicial favoritism to the optionor when difficult
questions of interpretation have arisen.20 1
For example, when courts have confronted issues involving the effective-
ness of acceptances tendered beyond an option period, they have consistently
construed the time requirements strictly, adhering to the principle that "time
is of the essence" in the typical option contract.2 °2 Likewise, the mailbox
rule,20 3 which is consciously pitched toward the offeree, generally is deemed
inapplicable to option contracts. 2 ' A few words about each of these illus-
trations will clarify why the optionor generally is the beneficiary of a doubt
in the option context, and why he should be similarly treated in the rejec-
tion/ acceptance scenario.
200. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Andrews, 7 N.C. App. 517, 173 S.E.2d 67 (1970).
201. See, e.g., Shell Oil v. Kellison, 58 N.W.2d 724 (Iowa 1968); Skarda v. Davis, 83 N.M.
342, 491 P.2d 1153 (1971). Butsee Stull v. Hicks, 59 Ill. App. 3d 665, 375 N.E.2d 981 (1978).
202. See infra notes 205-41 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 242-70 and accompanying text.
204. See Note, supra note 55, at 524; see infra notes 258-68 and accompanying text.
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1. Time is of the Essence
In Cotter v. James L. Tapp Co.,205 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
found that a tenant's failure to comply literally with the terms of an option
provision to extend a lease negated his ability to exercise the option.
20 6
Under the terms of the lease, the tenant had secured a five-year option to
rent certain "expansion areas" and also had acquired the right to extend the
option for another three-year period "upon the payment by tenant of thirty
cents ($0.30) per sq. ft. per year ... payable monthly as an option cost."2 °7
Prior to the expiration of the principal option, the tenant notified the op-
tionor of his intention to exercise the renewal option, but failed to tender a
monetary payment.20 8
The court rejected the tenant's argument that the notification should have
sufficed to preserve the option, and cited two basic premises in support of its
conclusion.20 9 First, "option contracts are strictly construed in favor of the
optionor and against the optionee. '"210 In this regard, the court found the
forfeiture that such an approach might occasion unpersuasive: "[The] argu-
ment by the defendant that the courts do not favor forfeiture and therefore
the option to renew must be granted, overlooks the fact that options because
unilateral, are strictly construed against the party claiming the option."
211
Second, the court recited an equally well-settled proposition that, if an
option requires compliance within a certain period, time is of the essence and
precise adherence to the terms of the agreement are necessary.21 2 Because
the terms of the option required the payment of money, the court concluded
that notice alone could not qualify as an acceptance.
2
13
Similarly, in Mathews v. Kingsley,2 4 an optionee failed to exercise an op-
tion to purchase a parcel of land and opted instead to negotiate for a substi-
tute option agreement. 2  The original option contract required that the
205. 267 S.C. 647, 230 S.E.2d 715 (1976).
206. Id. at 653-54, 230 S.E. at 718.
207. Id. at 650, 230 S.E. at 716.
208. Id. at 652, 230 S.E. at 717.
209. Id. at 653-54, 230 S.E. at 718.
210. Id. at 653, 230 S.E. at 717.
211. Id., 230 S.E. at 717 (quoting Southern Silica Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Hoefer, 215 S.C.
480, 497, 56 S.E.2d 321, 328 (1949)). Yet, the lease renewal situation has proved to be the rare
fertile ground for sowing the seeds of the forfeiture argument and for finding a judicial willing-
ness to retreat from rigid adherence to the "time is of the essence" principle. See infra note
231.
212. 267 S.C. 653, 230 S.E. at 717-18.
213. Id. at 654, 230 S.E. at 718. "Defendant could have given written notice every day in
the month... and such notice still would not have satisfied a requirement to pay money." Id.
214. 100 So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
215. Id. at 447-48.
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optionee provide written notice of an intention to exercise the option, as well
as tender a ten percent deposit toward the ultimate purchase price.2 16 The
optionee complied with neither of these provisions prior to the expiration of
the option period. 2 17 After a two-month post-expiration negotiation period,
the parties reached an oral agreement, but they never executed a written
instrument. The optionor subsequently terminated the option.2 18  The
court, characterizing the option as "different from a contract to purchase"
and noting that the optionee had "no equitable interest" in the property in
question until he exercised the option, sustained the optionor's right to ter-
minate the outstanding offer. 219 The court explained that the optionee must
strictly comply with the terms of the option to make the option exercise
effective.22 °
With specific reference to the issue of timeliness, the court emphasized
that the "time named in the option contract is to be regarded as of the es-
sence of the option, whether expressly stated or not ... . ""' The court cau-
tioned, however, that an optionor could waive2 2 2 the time for performance
or, by his conduct, be estopped from insisting upon strict compliance.2 23
Smith v. Peninsula House, Inc. most poignantly demonstrates what a dif-
ference a day can make.22 4 In Smith, the manager of a beach club/motel
had secured a contract with the owner, giving him the right to purchase the
subject property on terms identical to those offered by a third-party if the
selling price were under $190,000.225 To exercise the option arising upon a
third party offer, the manager/optionee had to provide notification within
ten days.22 6 The notice was given on December 31, one day beyond the
December 30 deadline. 227 Notwithstanding the intervening holidays and the
absence of any palpable harm to the optionor, the court concluded that the
expiration of the ten-day period immediately terminated the power of
acceptance. 228
216. Id. at 449.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 446, 449-50.
220. Id. at 446.
221. Id. (emphasis added). See also Rosenauer v. Pacelli, 174 Cal. App. 2d 673, 345 P.2d
102 (1959). But see Rank v. Sullivan, 132 So. 2d 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (time was not of
the essence in option contract).
222. 100 So. 2d at 447.
223. Id. See also Ellis v. Waldrop, 627 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
224. 65 N.J. Super. 341, 167 A.2d 807 (1961).
225. Id. at 344, 167 A.2d at 808.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 345, 167 A.2d at 809.
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A litany of additional case authority and critical commentary reinforces
the proposition that strict compliance with the terms of an option is gener-
ally required.22 9 The "time is of the essence" principle, employed either con-
structively or through the explicit language of an agreement, provides a
glowing illustration of judicial predilection to interpret option contracts in
favor of the optionor. While courts and commentators may disagree on the
extent to which the option language must explicitly make such time the es-
sence of the agreement, there seems to be consensus that an optionor will
generally receive the benefit of any ambiguity.2 3 °
At times, application of this rule visits harsh consequences upon careless
or unwary optionees. The foregoing discussion exemplifies how optionees
have surrendered options after delays involving only days or hours.
2 3 1
Notwithstanding the potentially onerous consequences, one can justify judi-
cial preference for the optionor in several ways.
First, the very lifeblood of an option is usually an offer frozen for a fixed
or, in some instances, a reasonable period of time. An option immobilizes
the offeror until the offeree decides whether to accept (or, posited herein,
reject) the offer in chief. The optionee has purchased a period of time within
which he may freely test the waters, assess market conditions, and engage in
wholesale speculation. Therefore, there are normally no misgivings about
the importance of compliance with the timeframes outlined in the option.
Either explicitly or implicitly, options place optionees on notice that tardi-
229. See, e.g., A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 273-274; MURRAY, supra note 12, § 43B;
Rosenaur v. Pacelli, 174 Cal. App. 2d 673, 345 P.2d 102 (1959). As one court synopsized the
issue:
The reason why courts are strict in requiring an option to be exercised specifically as
to its terms and within the specified time, is because of the power that the optionee
exercises over the eventual formulation of a contract. Consequently, since the op-
tionee is the sole party capable of consummating the option, courts require strict
adherence to the option's terms, when the optionee is attempting to enforce the op-
tion. Thus, the requirement [exists] that [the acceptance] meet and correspond with
the option in accordance with the option's terms. Theobald v. Chumley, 408 N.E.2d
603, 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
230. See, e.g., Rice v. Wood, 91 N.C. App. 262, 371 S.E.2d 500 (1988); Sheppard v. An-
drews, 7 N.C. App. 517, 173 S.E.2d 67 (1970); Cotter v. James L. Tapp Co., 267 S.C. 647, 230
S.E.2d 715, 717 (1970).
231. See supra notes 201-30 and accompanying text. However, several courts have relaxed
the requirement that an optionee strictly adhere to the terms of the option when such indul-
gence aids in avoiding a forfeiture. See Ledford v. Adkins, 413 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967)
(holding that situations which caused the assignee to be delinquent in his payments for oil lease
would not result in forfeiture); see also Loitherstein v. IBM Corp., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 91, 413
N.E.2d 1146 (1980) (court did not impose arbitrary penalty for tenant's failure to make timely
payment on lease). Certain circumstances, such as an option for a lessee to renew a lease, seem
to warrant tempering the justice of the "time of the essence" principle with the mercy of the
"avoidance of forfeiture" concept. See A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.7.
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ness can be a fatal flaw. Even when the option lacks expressed "time is of
the essence" language, the nature of an irrevocable offer commands that the
option-exercise trigger date be construed as critical.2 32
A second rationale for favoring an optionor in this context may be. that the
consideration exchanged for the irrevocability is often minimal. Indeed, the
Second Restatement indulges a mere recitation of consideration supporting
an option without need for actual exchange or a categorical promise of some
barter.2 33 Professor Corbin acknowledges that an optionee generally surren-
ders a valuable consideration for the optional acceptance prerogative, but
aptly observes that:
[T]his consideration is usually a comparatively small sum of
money agreed upon as the exchange for the power of acceptance
for the specified time. When that time expires, the option holder
has received the full agreed equivalent of the price he paid for his
option; and a refusal to give effect to an acceptance that is one
minute late results in no forfeiture.
2 34
Case authority holding that the consideration technically necessary to se-
cure the option may be presumed when a lease contains a purchase option
underscores the insignificance of the consideration exchanged, and the func-
tional dispensation of the need to part with anything of meaningful value.2 35
Such a presumption is difficult to rebut and, absent a realistic way to parse
the segments of the lease payments, virtually allows an option without a
demonstrable indication that a lessee/optionee has provided independent
consideration to support the promise of irrevocability.
236
Third, the fact that an optionee generally holds all the cards dictates that
a close case entitles an optionor to some deference. As in a revocable offer,
an offeree has absolutely no duty to accept.237 For the often minimal consid-
eration paid, however, an optionee assures himself of the power of accept-
232. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. Because an option by its very nature
establishes a clearly defined timeframe within which the optionee may exercise the prerogative,
a reasonable person may plausibly infer that time is always of the essence in this type of a
transaction. Further, to extend the period beyond the established expiration date seems inap-
propriate, given the considerable advantage enjoyed by an offeree during an option period. See
A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.7, at 572.
233. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1) (1979); see also Mack v. Coker,
22 Ariz. App. 105, 523 P.2d 1342 (1974).
234. See A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 273. But see Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola
Co., 269 F. 796 (D.C.D. Del. 1920).
235. See Madison v. Marlatt, 619 P.2d 708, 714 (Wyo. 1980); Braten v. Baker, 323 P.2d
929, 931 (Wyo. 1958).
236. See A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 263 n.42; MURRAY, supra note 12, § 43B. See also
Brown-Forman Distrib. Corp. v. Northwest Liquor Co., 171 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1948).
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1979).
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ance for a fixed period. The transaction represents one of the few instances
in which the offeror is unavoidably locked in, while the offeree remains free
to obtain a better deal or no deal at all. Thus, some may view the transac-
tion as one-sided. Further, and of no small consequence, an offeror can
often dodge an acceptance, particularly in the pure unilateral contract set-
ting, while no such opportunity exists for the optionor.23' As Professor
Corbin has stated, the offeror of a revocable offer is "privileged to revoke...
[but] the option holder has a conditional contract right as well as a power of
acceptance; and the option giver has neither the privilege nor the power of
revocation.
239
For these reasons, an optionor receives the interpretative edge in close
cases. Why this premise should not apply in the rejection/acceptance situa-
tion is almost incomprehensible. The minimal consideration often ex-
changed, the emphasis upon the irrevocability component and an optionor's
vulnerable position dictate that courts should reward an optionor's expecta-
tion that a rejection or counter-offer represents an optionee's unwillingness
to accept the proposed offer. 24
Again, an optionee who is assured a full period to accept or reject, and
who chooses to make and gain the benefit of a "premature" decision, should
evoke little pathos when he changes his mind. For the same reasons, an
optionor, who fully exchanged the revocability prerogative for an optionee's
consideration, should be entitled to treat a rejection or its functional
equivalent as a transaction terminator without having to demonstrate some
justifiable and detrimental reliance on the subsequently recanted rejection.24'
2. The Mailbox Rule and the Option Contract Exception
The general refusal to apply the "mailbox" or "deposited acceptance" rule
to the acceptance of an offer embraced by an option contract represents an-
other illustration of judicial "favoritism" for the optionor. While this princi-
238. Professor Williston has noted that, "the offeror may see the approach of the offeree
and know that an acceptance is contemplated. If the offeror can say 'I revoke' before the
offeree accepts, however brief the interval of time between the two acts, there is no escape from
the conclusion that the offer is terminated." See S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, § 60B.
239. See A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 273 n.37.
240. See supra notes 132, 194 and accompanying text.
241. Again, it seems unduly burdensome to require an optionor to show a material change
in position to justify finding a rejection as an offer terminator. It suggests that no one should
place credence upon the bargain and the exchange of promises already made. That is, some
have described a rejection as a revocation of the right to accept. In this spirit, one could also
call a rejection a promise not to accept or to avail oneself of the remaining time allowed under
the option. In this admittedly attenuated sense, an optionor should have the legitimate expec-
tations realized from such promise, a release from all obligations, gratified. See supra notes
132, 194 and accompanying text. See also Farber & Matheson, supra note 132.
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pie has been referenced earlier,2 42 a brief summary of its background and
scope is necessary here to insure appreciation of the option contract excep-
tion and its significance.
The mailbox rule states that an appropriately and properly mailed accept-
ance becomes effective when an offeree deposits it in the mail; as opposed to
a rejection or revocation which becomes effective upon receipt.24 3 Thus, an
acceptance received after, but mailed before, a rejection creates an enforcea-
ble agreement, absent some demonstration of detrimental reliance by the of-
feror.2" The Florida District Court of Appeals, in Morrison v. Thoelke,245
perhaps most comprehensively articulated the mailbox rule, which is not
without its numerous exceptions.24 6 In Morrison, the court disallowed a
seller's rejection of an offer to buy real estate where an acceptance had been
sent, but not received, prior to such rejection. 24 7 The court discounted the
seller's argument that the right to recall mail made the post office the
sender's agent. Thus, the court refused to find that the rejection negated
seller's already posted acceptance.2 48 Acknowledging that both advocates
and opponents of the rule "muster persuasive argument, 2 49 the court found
that the balance tipped, "whether heavily or near imperceptively," toward
reinforcement of the deposited acceptance approach.2 0 Recognizing that at
some point the formation of a contract must be deemed completed, and
plainly not altogether comfortable with the final selection,25 1 the court rea-
soned that the "traditional acceptance of the rule as well as the modern
changes in effective long-distance communication," warranted continued
adherence.25 2
242. See supra notes 53-56, 203-04 and accompanying text.
243. See Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818); Mactiers Admrs. v. Firth, 6
Wend. 103 (N.Y. 1830).
244. See, e.g., E. Frederics, Inc. v. Felton Beauty Supply, 58 Ga. App. 320, 198 S.E. 324
(1938); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 comment c (1979).
245. 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
246. There are several qualifications to the mailbox rule, including the option contract ex-
ception, the mailing of an acceptance subsequent to the mailing of a rejection, and situations in
which the mails have been improperly used such as through an omitted or incorrect address,
insufficient postage, and the like. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 2-
23.
247. 155 So. 2d at 905.
248. Id. at 899.
249. Id. at 898.
250. Id. at 896.
251. Id. at 897.
252. Id. at 898. Although the court noted that traditional "acceptance" provided one rea-
son to reinforce the mailbox rule, one should not deem this opinion as mere slavish conformity.
On the contrary, the opinion presents an extremely detailed and probing analysis of the
mailbox rule. Professor Corbin characterized it as "the most complete review of the authori-
ties and reasoning... both judicial and academic, that this author has seen." See A. CORBIN,
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Among the arguments that justify the Morrison decision are: (1) the legal
rationale that the offeror is the master of the offer, including the timing and
mode of the acceptance;25 3 and, (2) the pragmatic rationale that as a matter
of proof, an offeree can more easily establish that he mailed an acceptance
than an offeror can demonstrate that he never received it. 254 Accordingly,
because an offeror can forestall operation of the deposited acceptance rule by
making the acceptance effective only upon receipt, it is plausible to permit an
offeree to rest assured that mailing an acceptance of an offer, not so qualified
by the offeror, has formed a contract. 2s In essence, the offeror in the typical
revocable offer situation is in the driver's seat. Therefore, the offeree derives
the benefit of the doubt in close cases.
The critics of the mailbox rule argue strenuously that it is "unjust and
indefensible" for both the offeror, who would be precluded from revoking his
offer before he had any knowledge of an acceptance, and the offeree, who
would be forbidden from withdrawing an acceptance "scant hours after it
was posted but days before the offeror knew of it."'256 Interestingly, these
antagonists have suggested that if the courts are preoccupied with protecting
the offeree from a spontaneous revocation, such security can be achieved by
the offeree's "providing consideration, by buying an option.
257
Yet, even in the context of an option contract, the point at which a mailed
acceptance becomes effective must still be addressed. In fact, courts in sev-
eral jurisdictions addressing this very issue have concluded that the mailbox
rule does not apply to option contracts.258 For example, the same jurisdic-
tion that embraced the mailbox rule in Morrison apparently adopts a differ-
ent approach to mailed acceptances tendered under an option arrangement.
In Maloney v. Atlantique Condominium Complex, Inc.,259 the sellers, pursu-
ant to a right of first refusal, delivered notice of intent to sell their condomin-
ium property.26° According to the agreement containing the first refusal
option, the buyer was required to tender acceptance of any offer to sell
within ten days. 261' A prospective buyer sought to exercise his "option" and
supra note 7, § 78 n.67; see also Reserve Ins. Co. v. Duckett, 249 Md. 108, 119, 238 A.2d 536,
542 (1968).
253. See, e.g., Union Interchange, Inc. v. Sierota, 144 Colo. 293, 355 P.2d 1089, 1091
(1960); see also A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 3.22.
254. See Note, supra note 55, at 530 n.49. See also Macneil, Time of Acceptance: Too
Many Problems For a Single Rule, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 947 (1964).
255. See A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 3.22.
256. See Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d at 904.
257. Id.
258. See Note, supra note 55, at 524, 534-36.
259. 399 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).




mailed his acceptance within the ten-day period. However, the acceptance
did not arrive until the eleventh day, after the sellers had already sold the
subject property to another buyer.26 2 Reversing the trial court's decision
that invalidated the sale,26 3 the District Court of Appeals held that the
mailbox rule did not apply to option contracts and preemptive rights of first
refusal. 2 '" Accordingly, the court deemed the timely mailed but tardily re-
ceived acceptance ineffective and approved the sale to the "interloping"
buyer.265
The court's opinion was somewhat idiosyncratic, focusing upon peculiar
characteristics of condominium conversions. In particular, the court placed
considerable emphasis upon the need for certainty, the effect of delays upon
the property's marketability, and the risk assumed by the offeree who
chooses to use the mails to respond.2 66 Yet, the one undeniable and univer-
sal predicate upon which the court distinguished mailed acceptances to revo-
cable offers from mailed acceptances to irrevocable offers is that the offeree
in the latter case has become the master and needs no additional
protection.26 7
Because an option freezes an offer for a fixed or reasonable period, an
optionee need not fear that an optionor will blithely revoke an offer after the
optionee places his acceptance securely in the mail carrier's hands. More-
over, the optionor then becomes vulnerable because he cannot withdraw his
offer during the relevant period and must await the optionee's "election."
Therefore, the delicate balance recognized by all courts and commentators
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1114.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1112-14.
267. Id. at 1113-14. The Maloney court made no significant effort to distinguish rights of
first refusal and option contracts with respect to the application of the deposited acceptance
rule. However, a distinction most definitely exists between the two concepts. See supra notes
155 and accompanying text. See also Smith v. Mitchell, 301 N.C. 58, 269 S.E.2d 608 (1980);
Di Maria v. Michaels, 90 A.D.2d 67, 455 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1982). Still, because the right of first
refusal generally ripens into an optlinWontract upon the receipt of a bona fide offer, it seems
appropriate to apply an exception to the-mailbox rule to both rights of first refusal and option
contracts. While differences exist between the two concepts, the underlying rationale support-
ing the exception survives such differentiation. See Vending Credit Corp. v. Trudy Toys Co., 5
Conn. Cir. Ct. 629, 633, 260 A.2d 135, 137 (1969); Salminen v. Farankson, 309 Minn. 438, 245
N.W.2d 839 (Minn. 1976). See also J. MURRAY, supra note 12, § 43B. But see Note, supra
note 55, at 535-36.
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must tip in favor of an offeror in light of the fact that the parties added the
element of irrevocability to the equation.268
In sum, an offeror indisputably receives a slight edge in option contracts.
It is similarly incontrovertible that this favoritism is a product of the of-
feror's pledge of irrevocability in exchange for often minimal, if not nominal,
consideration. This consideration does not bequeath an offeree with special
prerogatives such as allowing a mailed acceptance (received after the option
period) to overtake a communicated rejection, or permitting an acceptance
tendered after the option period has lapsed to be effective, absent the of-
feror's "waiver.
'269
Deviation from such preference for an optionor, when an optionee subse-
quently recants a rejection by a "timely" acceptance is anomalous indeed.
Why should the courts digress from the common law mailbox rule to pro-
vide an edge to an optionor, but eschew the common law rule governing
termination of offers to favor an optionee? The question has now become
rhetorical, with the obvious response that the majority of jurisdictions mis-
take the option period as the offeree's insular enclave within which a rejec-
tion is rendered a nullity. The irrevocable/irrejectable dichotomy and the
refutation of any claim that the entire option period belongs irretrievably to
the offeree should put such misperceptions to rest.27°
D. A Word About Waiver
A perusal of the case authority addressing questions surrounding accept-
ance or rejection of an irrevocable offer yields evidence that courts fre-
quently employ the term "waiver" to characterize the rejection. For
example, some courts have reinforced the premise advanced in this Article
268. See Maloney v. Atlantique Condominium Complex, Inc., 339 So. 2d at 1114; see also
Romain v. A. Howard Wholesale Co., 506 N.E.2d 1124, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). In
Romain, the Indiana court of appeals observed:
Under the option contract then, the option holder has a firm and dependable basis for
decision. His power of acceptance is absolute for the time agreed upon in the option
contract. The option holder has no interests needing protection. He can act
promptly and with confidence in reliance on the contract. There is thus no reason to
extend the rule that acceptance is operative upon mailing since the option contract
device itself fulfills the same purpose. To impose such a rule, where the parties have
not expressly provided, would alter the agreement by binding the option giver longer
than originally agreed and would inflict upon the option giver the risk of delay
avoided by entering into the option contract.
Id. (citations omitted). But see APC Operating Partnership v. Mackey, 841 F.2d 1031 (10th
Cir. 1988); Palo Alto Town & Country Village, Inc. v. BBTC Co., 11 Cal. 3d 494, 521 P.2d
1097, 113 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1974).
269. See supra notes 221-23; infra 273 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 176-99 and accompanying text.
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by labelling a counter-offer or rejection within an option period as a
"waiver." '271 Similarly, many courts have reasoned that an optionee or
holder of a right of first refusal, who fails to exercise the "option" in a timely
fashion or otherwise fails to adhere strictly to the option's terms, waives and
terminates the right to purchase.272 Correspondingly, some courts hold that
an optionor waives his right to insist on strict compliance with the time re-
quirement by indulging a tardy acceptance.273
In a technical sense, treating a rejection or similar contract formation
component as a "waiver" is an uncharacteristic and possibly inappropriate
use of that term. Typically, waiver arises in the context of a "performance"
analysis rather than as part of the contract "formation" process. Obviously,
a waiver occurring at the formation stage constitutes nothing more than a
modification of the terms in the offer or acceptance prior or simultaneous to
the completion of the agreement. 274 More commonly, the doctrine of waiver
applies to true performance questions, such as whether one party has surren-
dered his right to insist upon the other party's compliance with a condition
precedent.275 If such waiver has occurred, then the party for whose benefit
the condition existed must perform his end of the bargain, notwithstanding
the nonoccurrence of the condition. The qualified duty to act has been trig-
271. See, e.g., Jones v. Moncrief-Cook Co., 25 Okla. 856, 108 P. 403 (1908).
272. See, e.g., Ellis v. Waldrop, 627 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App. 1982) (optionee failed to exer-
cise its right of refusal within the prescribed 30-day period and therefore its rights under the
agreement were deemed waived); Green v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 511 So. 2d 569 (Fla. App.
4 Dist. 1987) (optionee deemed to have waived his right of refusal when he failed to comply
strictly with a provision of the agreement based upon an incorrect interpretation of the law);
see also LaGrave v. Jones, 336 So. 2d 1330 (Ala. 1976) (optionee permitted to waive a condi-
tion in the agreement that was for the exclusive benefit of the optionee, thereby requiring the
optionor to perform under the agreement).
273. See State ex. rel. Howeth v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 163 Mont. 355, 517 P.2d 722
(Mont. 1973) (optionor estopped from claiming lack of strict compliance when he received
notice prior to the termination date of the option and the optionee was justifiably led to believe
the optionor would accept the terms of payment); Beverly Bank v. Alsip Bank, 436 N.E.2d 598
(I11. Ct. App. 1982) (party to loan participation agreement may waive his legal right to insist
on strict performance); see also Townsend v. Melody Home Mfg. Co., 541 P.2d 1370 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1975).
274. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 11-30.
275. See A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.5. Farnsworth opines that the reason for an
overly broad utilization of the waiver concept centers upon the misplaced notion that employ-
ing the nomenclature "waiver" rather than "modification:" may relax the requirement of con-
sideration; may do away with the need to satisfy the writing requirement under the Statute of
Frauds; and, will require less precision in terms of identifying whether the necessary manifesta-
tion of assent is present. Id. § 8.5. See, e.g., Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prod.
Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 175, 436 N.E.2d 1265, 451 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1982). Yet, the continued misuse
of the term "waiver" is particularly vexatious to many contract scholars. See, e.g., J. MUR-
RAY, supra note 12, § I IIF.
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gered, even though the condition was not satisfied, because compliance with
such condition was excused by virtue of the waiver.276
Perhaps, one could argue that an optionee who rejects an offer made irrev-
ocable by the original consideration has surrendered or waived his legal right
to accept it at a later time. Certainly, in the most generic sense, an op-
tionee's decision to reject such an offer would qualify as a voluntary relin-
quishment of a recognized right277 to accept the offer within the designated
time period without the fear of intervening revocation. Yet, is this any dif-
ferent than saying that an offeree who rejects a revocable offer waives the
legal right to accept it thereafter? Except in the broadest view of the term
"waiver," the nomenclature is seemingly incorrect.278 In precise contract
law lexicon, this action or inaction does not amount to a waiver; but rather,
it simply constitutes a manifestation of intent not to accept an offer. The
language pertains to contract formation, not contract performance.27 9
Presumably, proponents of the majority view would argue that the per-
formance analysis is wholly appropriate and that the rejection does not meet
the prerequisites of waiver necessary to extinguish an optionor's duty. That
is, the option contract, whether existing as a separate agreement or embrac-
ing the underlying offer to buy or sell,28 ' contains a promise to hold an offer
open for a set or reasonable period of time.28' The duty to preserve for the
276. See Clark v. West, 193 N.Y. 349, 86 N.E. 1 (1908); Schultz v. Los Angeles Dons, 107
Cal. App. 2d 718, 238 P.2d 73 (1951).
277. See Hoxie v. Home Ins. Co., 32 Conn. 21 (1864). Characterizing a waiver as a "vol-
untary relinquishment of a known right" is not without its problems. See 1. MURRAY, supra
note 12, § 11IF n.3. Yet, this definition is employed with regularity. See, e.g., Pentmanta
Corp. v. Hollis, 520 N.E.2d 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Realty Growth Investors v. Council of
Unit Owners, 453 A.2d 450 (Del. 1982); Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., 320
N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1982). But see Garrard v. Lang, 514 So. 2d 933 (Ala, 1987).
278. See A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.5. Professor Corbin acknowledges that
waiver is a term of "indefinite connotation" that "like a cloak, .... covers a multitude of sins."
Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 754 (1919). Only with such an
oversized cloak could one appropriately use the term waiver in a formation context.
279. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 2.25.
280. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text. On the surface, it would seem as
though the argument for a "performance" approach is stronger when the option is part of a
separate and distinct agreement. However, in reality, the debate will generally assume the
same shape regardless of the nature of most option contracts.
281. Id. There is some question as to whether, by virtue of the option, the optionor has
promised "not to revoke" or, alternatively, has promised to give the optionee the exclusive
right to act during the option period - or both. Arguably, if it only is the former, a "waiver"
by the optionee might, in an attenuated sense, leave a residue of the acceptance prerogative for
a reasonable time if the optionor does not promptly revoke. If, however, the latter construc-
tion obtains, then the optionee's "waiver" of the right to accept should terminate the power of
acceptance. For present purposes, it will be assumed that, regardless of the characterization
(both of which have been employed herein), the optionee's rejection/waiver will bar subse-
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optionee this insulated right to accept or reject is triggered by the payment of
consideration, or promise of same, that seals the option portion of the trans-
action. Thus, for example, in a bilateral option contract, this promise not to
revoke arguably creates a constructive condition upon which an optionee's
promise to pay consideration depends.282
Clearly, an optionee has the ability to waive certain conditions existing for
his benefit.283 However, ample authority establishes that a condition form-
ing a material part of an exchange cannot be "waived" or, stated more ap-
propriately, "modified," without consideration, even if such condition exists
for the benefit of the waiving party.284 Little doubt exists that the promise of
irrevocability and the condition that it begets present an advantage unique to
the optionee. Yet, because the irrevocability facet is either embraced in a
separate contract or is a distinct, critical component of a single contract, it is
arguably a material part of the exchange and thus "unwaivable" without
consideration. 285 The majority would likely urge further that, even if the
quent acceptance even without an explicit revocation. See further Romain v. A. Howard
Wholesale Co., 506 N.E.2d 1124, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
282. See generally Kingston v. Preston, Lofft. 194, 2 Doug. 684 (K.B. 1773); see also How-
ard v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 540 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1976); Roth v. Harding, 64 Wash. 2d
231, 391 P.2d 526 (1969). In one sense, the conditional nature of the promises will depend
upon the required order of performance. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note
4, § 11-25. Further, if the option contract were unilateral (i.e., formed by the payment of
consideration in exchange for the promise not to revoke), then the terminology "release" or
"discharge" would probably be more appropriate than "waiver." In either event, much of the
argument dealing with waiver would have equal applicability to release, particularly regarding
the possible dispensation with the need for consideration. See, e.g., U.C.C. 1-107 (1977); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 274-277 (1979).
283. A party cannot waive a condition unless the condition exists for his benefit. Clearly,
the non-benefited party cannot waive a condition and self-excuse his own duty. See, e.g., Bliss
v. Carter, 26 Mich. App. 177, 182 N.W.2d 54 (1970). Further, if a condition exists for the
benefit of both parties, then it cannot be waived unilaterally by either. See, e.g., Wallstreet
Properties, Inc. v. Gassner, 53 Or. App. 650, 632 P.2d 1310 (1981); Omaha Pub. Power Dist.
v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 327 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1964).
284. Of course, such a requirement could be dispensated if the waiver related to an immate-
rial part of the underlying exchange. See Rose v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 423 F. Supp. 1162
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Couture Coordinates, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
285. See Salvatore v. Trace, 55 N.J. 362, 262 A.2d 385 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 84(2) (1979). In the analogous context of the sale of goods, see U.C.C. § 2-
209(5) (1977). As indicated above, when the occurrence of the condition is a material part of
the agreed exchange, it generally cannot be removed without consideration or detrimental
reliance. In that event, use of the term "waiver" is technically erroneous. See generally J.
MURRAY, supra note 12, § 11 F. Nonetheless, courts persistently use the phraseology "waiver
supported by consideration," and the author has exercised such license at certain points herein.
See infra note 286 and accompanying text. See also Colbath v. H. B. Stebbins Lumber Co.,
127 Me. 406, 144 A. 1 (1829); Smith v. Minneapolis Threshing Co., 89 Okla. 156, 158, 214 P.
178, 180 (1923).
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condition could be waived, such waiver could still be withdrawn and the
condition resurrected, provided the offeror has not changed his position in
reliance upon the initial waiver.286 To that end, the optionee could argue
that there can be no greater manifestation of the withdrawal of the waiver
(rejection) than a subsequent acceptance within the option period.
Under this approach, which seems to reflect the unarticulated rationale of
Ryder v. Wescoat,287 a duty not to revoke (and the optionee's exclusive pero-
gative to accept) persists, unless the optionor materially changes his position
or an offeror returns all or a portion of the optionee's original consideration.
That is, the rejection will be ineffectual unless the optionor provides the new
consideration to support, in the broadest sense, the optionee's waiver of ir-
revocability (promise not to accept), or establishes the reliance necessary to
create an estoppel.
288
This rationale undoubtedly formed part of the predicate for the Second
Restatement's language suggesting that a rejection would not terminate the
power of acceptance under an option contract "unless the requirements are
met for the discharge of a contractual duty. '28 9 This language implies that,
286. See Goebel v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 83 Wis. 2d 668, 266 N.W.2d 352 (1978).
Again, although there is no explicit language identifying the initial rejection as a waiver, and a
subsequent withdrawal as a retraction of such waiver, to the extent this issue is discussed in
performance terms, such constructions can be inferred. Interestingly, some courts have fur-
ther abused legal nomenclature by characterizing the acceptance or rejection of an option con-
tract as an "election." Flickinger v. Heck, 187 Cal. 111, 113-14, 200 P. 1045 (1921). See also
Martin v. Lott, 482 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972). In Martin v. Lott, the court concluded
that a rejection of an offer embodied in a preemptive right to buy terminates the power of
acceptance:
When the owner of property subject to a pre-emptive right declares his intention to
sell, the holder of the right has an election to purchase the property or decline ....
As in the case of any other offer specifying no time for acceptance, the power of
acceptance does not continue indefinitely but terminates on expiration of a reason-
able time or by express rejection, or by conduct clearly inconsistent with an intention
to purchase.
Id. at 922. The court, however, attempts to distinguish its facts from Humble Oil & Ref. Co.,
428 S.W.2d 921, (Tex. 1968), by asserting that the "present agreement is not an option which
gives a power of acceptance at any time within a specified period notwithstanding previous
rejection." Id. at n.8. The distinction drawn is anemic, at best, and seems to be nothing more
than a feeble attempt to justify a conclusion plainly at war with Humble Oil and the majority
view. In any event, an election generally refers to a waiver after a condition has failed. Thus,
utilization of that term in the instant context only serves to muddy the semantic waters. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 (1979); see also J. MURRAY, supra note 12,
§ IlIF; J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 4, § 11-32.
287. 535 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
288. See supra notes 280-87 and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 84, 87 (1979); Industrial Mach. Inc. v. Creative Displays, 344 So. 2d 743 (Ala.
1977); A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 752 n.4.
289. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 37 (1979).
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barring some evidence of a discharge, the duty not to revoke would continue
until the period of irrevocability lapsed.2 9" However, for the reasons ad-
vanced below, it is submitted that this rationale is untenable or, at the very
least, does not support the proposition that an irrevocable offer survives an
offeree's rejection or counter-offer.
First, an option contract, while theoretically a contract separate and dis-
tinct from the main agreement, represents a unique concept whose most im-
portant feature is rendering an otherwise revocable offer irrevocable. The
existence of an option contract as a distinct entity is purely a function of
legal accident or convenience. It is a vehicle designed for one short trip, a
road to a rejection or acceptance, free from impediments such as a possible
revocation during the optionee's process of contemplation. As Professors
Calamari and Perillo astutely note: "The first question that must be consid-
ered is did the option contract arise .... Once it arises so that there is an
irrevocable offer then one is dealing essentially with an offer and acceptance
situation and thus the rules of acceptance ... apply."29'
In discussing the various types of option configurations and the technical
differences between a power to revoke and a right to revoke, Professors
Calamari and Perillo declare that whether the option is one contract or two
separate agreements, the result remains the same: "we are still free to say
that the words option contract and irrevocable offer are used
interchangeably." 292
Thus, even though an option holder possesses a "conditional contract
right as well as a power of acceptance," '293 the proper emphasis should be
placed upon the irrevocability of the offer, the inchoate contract, the vulner-
ability of the optionor to an acceptance, and the optionor's inability to abort
the offer until something occurs to terminate the power of acceptance. Thus,
it seems counter-intuitive to apply principles uniquely suited to an analysis
addressing the performance obligations of parties to an executory con-
tract.294 The option contract, although arguably a distinct agreement, exists
290. There are an infinite number of events that could act to discharge a contractual duty.
While it is unnecessary to list them here, a brief litany can be found in J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 4, §§ 21-1 to 21-17. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 274-277 (1979). In any event, it is clear that there are instances in which a duty may be
discharged without new consideration. Id. See also infra notes 296-304 and accompanying
text.
291. Id. See also A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 43.
292. Id. at 124.
293. A. CORBIN, supra note 7, § 273.
294. This situation is not the only instance in which courts have misapplied waiver in the
context of an issue that deserves treatment under offer and acceptance principles. See supra
note 275. The application of waiver here, however, seems particularly inappropriate consider-
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on a continuum as a stepping stone to the consummation of the transaction-
in-chief. As such, it is most reasonable to assess an offeree's response to an
irrevocable offer under traditional tenets of offer and acceptance. Such an
approach leads irresistibly to the conclusion that a rejection would terminate
the option.295
Further, even if the question commands partial attention under a perform-
ance analysis, a rejection may operate as a waiver of the irrevocability condi-
tion or the exclusive right to accept, even without consideration. Likewise, if
"discharge" is the word of choice, then the rejection, standing alone, quali-
fies as a suitable renunciation or discharge of the duty. The evolving juris-
prudence in this area has considerably relaxed the consideration
requirements for waiver in general and option contracts in particular. For
example, the Second Restatement recognizes that mere recitals of considera-
tion, unattended by a promise or actual exchange, may satisfy validation
requirements for an option contract.296 Indeed, the comments attending
section 87 make it abundantly clear that the recital of consideration is for-
mal, not substantive. Thus, many courts will refuse even to entertain evi-
dence that an offeree has not paid the recited consideration.297
Even where the facts indicate that such recital was unfulfilled or payment
declined, courts have been loathe to void the transaction on consideration
grounds.298 Similarly, certain types of modifications at the executory stage
of an agreement may be enforceable even in the absence of new considera-
tion, provided that the modifications are fair and equitable, and have been
prompted by changes in circumstances not anticipated at the time of the
contract's formation.299 In numerous other areas, consideration has become
a shadow of its former self, often dispensated or fabricated from whole
cloth.3°
ing the clear fungibility of the option contract and irrevocable offer terminology. See supra
notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1) (1979). See also supra notes 58,
233-36 and accompanying text.
297. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1) comment c (1979). Compare id.
§ 218 with Farrar v. Young, 158 W. Va. 977, 216 S.E.2d 575 (1975) (one dollar of considera-
tion sufficient to support transfer of deed) and In re Estate of Mingesz, 70 Wis. 2d 734, 235
N.W.2d 296 (1975) (words "for value received" in guaranty contract raise rebuttable presump-
tion that adequate consideration was given).
298. See Mack v. Cohen, 22 Ariz. App. 105, 523 P.2d 1342 (1974); Kucera v. Kavan, 165
Neb. 131, 84 N.W.2d 207 (1957).
299. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1979). See also Angel v. Murray,
113 R.I. 482, 32 A.2d 630 (1974); Linz v. Schuck, 106 Md. 220, 67 A. 286 (1907).
300. For example, courts often engraft an implied promise of "good faith" or "best efforts"
onto the face of a promise which, by its own terms, manifests no commitment whatsoever.
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Recent statutory prounouncements have demonstrated a legislative sensi-
tivity to the need to make consideration requirements less rigorous in the
areas of option contracts, contract modifications and the like.3"1 For exam-
ple, section 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code explicitly permits the
creation of a firm or irrevocable offer without consideration for the period of
the promised irrevocability or a reasonable time.30 2 Under this provision,
the option to accept is preserved for a period not to exceed ninety days sim-
ply on the strength of the offeror's written promise not to revoke.
See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917). In Wood, the
court declared:
The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the
sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today. A prom-
ise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with an obligation.'...
Without an implied promise, the transaction [in which no commitment was truly
made] cannot have such business 'efficacy as both parties must have intended that at
all events it should have.'
Id. at 91, 118 N.E. at 214-15. Similarly, courts have construed notice requirements that
attend contracts containing pure cancellation-at-will clauses as constituting sufficient consider-
ation to support the contract. Thus, even though the bald cancellation prerogative seems to
render the agreement bereft of any true commitment, courts, by both implying a reasonable
notice provision and construing such notice provision as detriment, avoid the illusory promise
dilemma. See Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. U.S., 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945). But see
Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crush Co., 296 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1924). See also
U.C.C. §§ 2-306, 309 (1987). See also G. GILMORE, supra note 180, at 62-64; Goetz & Scott,
Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980);
Metzger & Phillips, supra note 133.
This increased relaxation of the need for consideration is strikingly evoked in the Second
Restatement's treatment of certain discharges:
If a party, before he has fully performed his duty under a contract, manifests to the
other party his assent to discharge the other party's duty to render part or all of the
agreed exchange, the duty is to that extent discharged without consideration.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 275 (1979). Illustration 2 of this section is
instructive:
A and B make a contract under which A promises to build a fence and B promises to
pay A $1,000. As A begins to build the fence, he says to B, 'The price we agreed on
was too hight, and you need pay only $900 for the fence.' A then builds the fence.
B's duty to pay A to the extent of $100 is discharged and B owes A only $900.
Id.
301. See, e.g., LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 1933 (West 1987); N.Y. GEN. OBL. LAW § 5-1109
(McKinney 1978); Pennsylvania Uniform Written Obligation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 6
(Purdon 1967).
302. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1977). Clearly, this provision implicitly protects an unwary con-
sumer who has received a representation from a merchant that the merchant will hold an offer
open. It places the emphasis upon the promise, rather than a formal requirement of considera-
tion, when the offeree receives written reaffirmation of the promise not to revoke. The absence
of consideration could compel a conclusion that a rejection or pure counter-offer in a sale of
goods context would terminate an irrevocable offer - even in the eyes of the majority. See A.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 3.24.
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If the offer can be made irrevocable without consideration, then surely an
optionee can waive the option thus created without consideration. Admit-
tedly, in a non-code context, common law still technically requires consider-
ation to secure the irrevocability; but, this consideration is often minimal,
occasionally presumed, and possibly never even paid.3 °3 Moreover, little
doubt exists that the parties can effect a waiver without consideration when
the performance waived is an immaterial part of the exchange. Although
the majority probably would urge that the irrevocability is the heart of the
option arrangement, thus material, equally persuasive is the idea that the
irrevocability component, like time of performance, is a formal, immaterial
part of the broader contract to buy or sell.3°
The remaining loose end involves the right of the optionee to revive his
waiver/rejection and renew the irrevocability of an option. A rejection in
this narrow context leaves no opportunity for such a renewal. The accept-
ance does not resurrect the condition of irrevocability, so much as it at-
tempts to act on the initial offer as if no waiver had occurred.3 °5
The act of manifesting an intent to forego the option must be deemed
"conclusive" rather than "suspensive." One commentator addressing this
issue suggests that:
303. See supra notes 233-36, 297-99 and accompanying text.
304. Ample authority supports the proposition that the time for performance is not a mate-
rial part of an exchange. Even when the parties explicitly make time of the essence in a con-
tract, courts have found that an optionor's indulgence of a tardy acceptance constitutes a
waiver of any requirement that the time period be strictly followed. See supra notes 222-23
and accompanying text. Arguably then, the duty not to revoke a portion of the overall agree-
ment to buy or sell, though material insofar as a discrete option contract exists, could be quite
immaterial vis-a-vis the contract-in-chief. That is, a waiver of the irrevocability component
could be placed on the same footing with a waiver of the need to accept within a designated
timeframe when the parties have specifically made time of the essence. Each case involves
explicit obligations of the optionor and optionee regarding rules governing the acceptance of
the underlying offer. With regard to the duty not to revoke, the optionor has explicitly repre-
sented that he will not revoke within a designated period of time. With respect to the "time is
of the essence" provision, the optionee has made it clear that he will accept within a certain
timeframe or else imperil his ability to consummate the agreement. Accordingly, it is not
totally implausible to suggest that the duty not to revoke constitutes an immaterial part of the
exchange to the extent that the option contract component, though theoretically independent
in some cases, exists as part of a larger transaction. Thus, those courts reasoning that a
counter-offer or rejection of an option "effectively negate[d] or waive[d] the valid exercise of
[an] option," are persuasive to the extent that a performance analysis and the attendant
"waiver" nomenclature are appropriate. See Green v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 511 So. 2d
569, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
305. See Oleg Cassini v. Couture Coordinates Inc., 297 F. Supp. 821, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1969):
"Even when time of performance... is of the essence... conduct may be such as to indicate a




In the case of rejection before completion of the time specified in
an option, the grantee or offeree is in the same position as an obli-
gee who renounces a term stipulated for his benefit. In an option,
indeed, the time specified is the term for the performance of the
grantor's obligation not to revoke the offer. That term is
resolutory, rather than suspensive, and clearly intended for the
benefit of the obligee.
306
Explaining that the optionee may avail himself of the entire option period
or renounce such privilege, Professor Litvinoff continues:
In making a rejection before the deadline the grantee is expressing
an intent not to avail himself of the time not yet elapsed, which
clearly amounts to a renunciation of the term. It is a well known
principle that the party for whose exclusive benefit a term has been
established may renounce it.3° 7
Finally, Litvinoff draws the only possible conclusion given the backdrop
that he has framed:
Because that term is resolutory, the obligee's renunciation puts
an end to the duty of the obligor who is now free from obligation.
After a rejection, thus, the grantor of the option is no longer bound
not to revoke, and, therefore, the grantee may no longer accept if
the grantor does not renew his consent.3"8
Yet, Litvinoff concedes unnecessarily that his argument applies to options
created by statute. Accordingly, he suggests that it may be unavailing if the
option has been secured by consideration. His rationale pays homage to the
sacrosanct but tenuous notion that an optionee paying consideration has
bought the entire period. But, given the minimal consideration generally
paid in these contexts (and the dispensation with consideration in others),
together with the fact that an optionee cannot reject after acceptance within
the option period, this assumption that an optionee has paid for the entire
timeframe has lived too charmed a life."° Professor Litvinoff's basic prem-
ise regarding the resolutory, not suspensive, nature of the optionee's initial
renunciation, is wholly appropriate to any rejection of an irrevocable offer.
The conclusions that he draws should apply equally to all rejections of op-
tion contracts, regardless of the vehicle employed to secure the
irrevocability.
Thus, whether viewed against the background of the evolving common
law, the observations of noted contracts commentators, or recent legislative
306. Litvinoff, supra note 57, at 752 (footnote omitted).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 176-99 and accompanying text.
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pronouncements, the requirement of consideration, particularly in the con-
text of waiver or modification, hardly amounts to a wooden absolute.3 1 °
Therefore, it is hardly a subversive notion to suggest that the rejection of an
option contract effectively waives the right to accept the underlying offer,
assuming in the first instance that a "performance" analysis is appropriate.
E. The Third-Party Beneficiary Analogy
Finally, the Second Restatement's treatment of an analogous situation in-
volving a third-party beneficiary's disclaimer of rights provides a telling
comment on the inherent contradiction in the majority's position.31' Section
306 of the Second Restatement provides in pertinent part: "A beneficiary
who has not previously assented to the promise for his benefit may ...
render any duty to himself inoperative from the beginning by disclaimer.
'" 312
A promisor's duty may be discharged without consideration or formal re-
quirement, provided that the beneficiary manifests the requisite disclaimer
within a "reasonable time after learning" of the promise's existence.313
Comment b to section 306 notes that the promisor's duty arises without as-
sent of the third party, and that the disclaimer has the same effect on such
duty as if no promise had been made. Not surprisingly, this comment rec-
ommends a comparison to section 38, which declares that a rejection or
counter-offer terminates the power of acceptance. Comment b also cautions
that a disclaimer, after assent, operates "only if the requirements are met for
discharge of a contractual duty," specifically referencing section 37.314
Interestingly, the comments to section 306 cross-reference sections 37 and
38. Comparisons of a third-party beneficiary's disclaimer and an optionee's
rejection become irresistible. The situation involving a third party benefici-
310. Indeed, even such stalwart concepts as the need for some type of reliance to support a
promissory estoppel are being threatened. The threat assumes the form of progressive legal
analysts who opine that promises are to be enforced if they reflect commitments entered "in
furtherance of economic activity." See Farber & Matheson, supra note 132, at 945. These
commentators conceive an independent cause of action requiring "neither satisfaction of tradi-
tional notions of consideration nor the specific showing of detriment associated with promis-
sory estoppel." Id. at 929. Certainly, a rejection of the option, framed as a promise not to
accept, exemplifies the type of commitment envisioned by Professors Farber and Matheson.
Requiring consideration or a reliance substitute to give meaning to this commitment again
simply exalts form over substance.
311. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 306 (1979). Professor Joseph Perillo ini-
tially suggested the possible applicability of a "third party beneficiary" analogy. Telephone
conversation with Professor Joseph Perillo, Oct. 6, 1989. He deserves credit for the sugges-
tion, but he also is to be given an automatic disclaimer from any "liability" resulting from this
author's development of the idea.
312. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 306 (1979).
313. Id.
314. Id. comment b.
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ary's disclaimer of a promisor's duty resembles an optionee's rejection of an
optionor's duty not to revoke. Once an optionee accepts the underlying of-
fer, he should not have the power to abort the acceptance unilaterally, unless
the requirements are met for the discharge of a contractual duty. Similarly,
if a third-party beneficiary has assented to the underlying contract bequeath-
ing certain benefits to him, then he cannot disclaim these rights unless he has
met the requisite contractual discharge criteria.31 5 Proceeding along these
lines, a third-party beneficiary may disclaim a promisor's duty prior to an
assent without consideration, even though the promisor and promisee have
already formed an agreement. By analogy, one would assume that an op-
tionee's rejection, read "disclaimer," of an option already formed through
the collateral option contract should discharge an offeror's duty not to re-
voke, just as the third-party beneficiary's disclaimer discharges the duty as-
sumed by the promisor.
Section 306 correctly references section 38 as the appropriate polestar
when the third-party beneficiary has not assented to the original agreement.
Section 306 also explicitly suggests comparison to section 37 when assent has
already been provided. The internal consistency is beyond question, and the
references to section 37 and 38 are sound. However, when one juxtaposes a
third-party beneficiary's pre-assent disclaimer with an optionee's rejection,
and when the Restatement categorically forecloses applicability of section 38
to the option contract, the anomaly becomes immediately evident. The re-
jection of the option bears a striking similarity to the disclaimer of the duty
owed to a third-party beneficiary. If section 38 should apply to the pre-
assent disclaimer of a third-party beneficiary, it logically should apply to
rejections of an option contract.
This approach reinforces the premise of this Article in two ways. First, it
supports the proposition that this issue, though hybrid in form, is properly
one of offer and acceptance, hence the applicability of section 38. Second,
the fact that a duty not to revoke exists in a discrete option agreement does
not negate the argument that an optionee's rejection can serve to discharge
such duty without consideration or other formal requirement.3 6 Thus, the
315. Id. See also id. § 304. Again, the duty owed to the third party beneficiary arises upon
the execution of the contract between the promisor and promisee. Similarly, the duty not to
revoke the contract in chief between an optionor and optionee arises upon the payment of
consideration in exchange for the promise of irrevocability. Thus, in both cases, independent
transactions produce duties that parties may reject or disclaim without any formality. How-
ever, once the underlying contracts have been formed, the appropriate test should be whether
the requisite standards for discharge of a contractual duty have been satisfied.
316. In a slightly attenuated but certainly not implausible twist, one may argue that the
rejection of an offer contained in an option contract operates much the same as a traditional
condition subsequent. A condition subsequent is defined broadly as an event that the parties
1990]
Catholic University Law Review
surrender of the irrevocability option, whether characterized as a rejection
or waiver, should terminate the power of acceptance or, alternatively, dis-
charge the duty not to revoke.
While one can reach an intellectually satisfactory accommodation through
either formation or performance avenues, the most reasonable and direct
route to a solution is to couch the option as an irrevocable offer, evaluate the
termination possibilities under traditional rules of offer and acceptance (at
least with regard to counter-offers and rejections) and assess the offer's con-
tinuing vitality under these tenets. Such an approach yields but one conclu-
sion: the rejection and most true counter-offers will terminate the offer
embraced by the option contract, and will negate the power of acceptance.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
An outright rejection or a pure counter-offer as defined above should ter-
minate the power of acceptance whether the offer be revocable or irrevoca-
ble. There is simply no adequate basis to justify a special approach to option
contracts, particularly with respect to outright rejections. Accordingly, sec-
tion 37 should be modified at a minimum to exclude references to rejections
agree will serve to discharge a duty of performance. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.2.
The essence of the condition subsequent is that the duty in question has already arisen, and the
operative effect of the occurrence of the condition will be to eliminate the need to fulfill the
promised performance. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 250(b) (1932). The Second Re-
statement defines conditions as only those events that would fit under the former definition of
conditions precedent. See id. § 224. Therefore, it dispenses with any event that serves to ex-
tinguish a duty after performance has occurred.
Although there is no expressed condition here, one can construct a condition from the over-
all arrangement in this fashion: The optionor promises not to revoke, or promises to hold an
offer open, during a designated period. This duty arises upon the tendering of consideration
(either through actual performance such as paying money or through a promise of same). The
duty can only be extinguished upon the occurrence of certain events such as the expiration of a
fixed time period or the optionee's rejection/counter-offer (an implied in fact or, possibly,
constructive condition subsequent). The distinction between an implied-in-fact condition and
a constructive condition is significant. In the former, the condition will operate as an express
condition, and therefore require strict compliance. A constructive condition requires only sub-
stantial performance in order to trigger the corresponding duty. See Howard v. Federal Crop
Ins. Corp., 540 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1976); Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889
(1921). In this instance, a reasonable inference, drawn from the totality of the parties' agree-
ment, is that a rejection is intended to extinguish the duty not to revoke.
Admittedly, this "construction" is somewhat contrived and perhaps reads too much into the
language of the typical option contract. However, it represents little more than a logical reac-
tion to the improvident wedging of an offer and acceptance issue into a rigid performance
analysis. In any event, the duty not to revoke, triggered by the payment of the optionee's
consideration, is discharged by the rejection, and the offer is aborted. See, e.g., Northwestern
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 56 Okla. 188, 155 P. 524 (1916); see also Barza v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 281 Mich. 532, 275 N.W. 238 (1937) (failure to act within a specified period
discharges party's duty to perform).
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and counter-offers. For purposes of clarification, a new section should be
drafted to reflect the retooled approach. The following phraseology would
suffice:
[T]he power of acceptance of an offer contained in an option
contract, or other like offer rendered irrevocable by consideration,
statute, or other formality, shall be terminated if the offeree
manifests an intent to reject such offer, either by means of an out-
right rejection or a counter-offer.
Under this model, a counter-offer that would have the force and effect of a
rejection shall not include any response that manifests the optionee's desire
to hold the offer open during further consideration of the offer, notwith-
standing non-conformity in the optionee's response. Likewise, such a
counter-offer shall not operate to terminate the optionee's power of accept-
ance where the optionor has manifested his intention to invite counter-offers
and other negotiations during the option period. Most importantly, a defi-
nite and reasonable acceptance that contains additional or varied terms will
not serve to abort the offer. Such a response will be deemed an acceptance,
with the determination of whether to include additional terms left to com-
mon law devices or possibly to analogous statutory machinery such as sec-
tion 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code.3 17
Thus, the only counter-offers that would serve as functional equivalents to
rejections would be those in which the optionee in no way manifested accept-
ance or the optionee conditioned his acceptance upon the insertion of terms
not included in the original offer 18 Any other response, such as a grum-
bling acceptance with additional inquiries, an acceptance that adds addi-
tional terms, an acceptance that expressly or implicitly manifests the
offeree's intent to continue negotiating, or any similar manifestation of as-
sent either would constitute an acceptance of the option, or, at the very least,
would preserve the offer for a subsequent, unqualified acceptance within the
option period. Aside from the obvious changes regarding the effects of an
outright rejection, and, possibly, the proposed characterization of the type of
"counter-offers" addressed by section 2-207, the proposal reaffirms and clari-
317. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (1977). See also supra note 46.
318. There is a middle ground that may be more palatable to those jurisdictions unwilling
to make such a dramatic departure from the mirror image rule. A response that constitutes a
definite and reasonable acceptance, but contains additional terms, could rest in a limbo status
until the option expires or a more definite reply is made by the optionee. Thus, a response
represented by section 61 of the Second Restatement or section 2-207 of the U.C.C. would not
constitute an acceptance of the irrevocable offer, but it would also not terminate the offeree's
power of acceptance. This approach retains much of the mirror image rule, but recognizes the
peculiar attributes of an option contract, and reinforces the logical expectations of the typical
optionee.
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fies several other Restatement provisions governing counter-offers and
rejections.319
As described throughout this Article, leaving the current state of the law
unaltered would constitute a continued corruption of existing contract law
principles for no apparent purpose. On the other hand, a wholesale revision
that allows any non-mirror image response to terminate an irrevocable offer
ignores the practical implications of option contracts and the reasonable ex-
pectations of the contractors. The proposal herein offers an accommodation
that permits all outright rejections and certain counter-offers, as narrowly
defined in the Second Restatement, to terminate an optionee's power of ac-
ceptance. This approach should satisfy the needs of contract purists and
commercial pragmatists alike without appreciably subverting the principles
of either side.
319. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 38, 39, 59, 61 (1979).
